SECTION TWO: STRUCTURALISM AND OTHER TRENDS IN LINGUISTICS

The legacy of structuralism. Structuralist notions in contemporary linguistics

Klaas Willems and Thomas Belligh
University of Ghent

Abstract. *The article explores five notions which erstwhile played an important role in Structural Linguistics but continue, often implicitly or in an altered form, to live on in current linguistics: (1) the view that each language should be described in its own terms, (2) the claim that a distinction must be made between language-specific encoded meaning and non-language-specific meaning, viz. contextually and encyclopaedically enriched utterance meaning, (3) the view that in between the grammar of a language system and individual acts of discourse an intermediary level of 'normal language use' must be taken into account, (4) the claim that paradigmatic contrasts are of paramount importance to arrive at a coherent understanding of language systems, and (5) the conviction that language systems and grammars are of an inherently intersubjective and social nature. As well as examining convergences that reflect the legacy of structuralism in contemporary linguistic research, the article pays attention to epistemologically significant differences in approach, which require careful reconsideration of structuralist notions that are widely taken for granted but not always interpreted in the same way.*

Keywords: linguistic historiography; structuralist notions in current linguistics; language-specific ('encoded') meaning and sense variation; normal language use; paradigmatic contrast

> *"The seductive siren song of structuralism has yet to fade away" (Givón 2016, 699)*

1. Introduction

There are many possible approaches to the history of linguistics, including launching new editions of historical publications, studying influences, affinities, intellectual crosscurrents, and evaluating former schools of thought and frameworks with a view to establish whether current research may profit from them or not (Gordon 1992, 387). It is the latter approach we are primarily interested in in this article. The introductory quote from Givón shows that such an evaluation can turn out differently depending on what one considers to be the objective of historiographical research, but also on one's understanding of what has actually happened in the history of linguistics. Whereas Givón (2016) openly expresses his irritation about Lazard's (2012) claim that we can still learn from linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure, we will take a more favourable view on structuralism in a spirit shared, we believe, by most contemporary historians of the language sciences. From this perspective, we maintain that linguists should not outright reject the work of previous generations but try to understand it and integrate their insights into current research. This is to some extent acknowledged by Givón as well when he points out that all linguists since structuralism in a sense 'must be *structuralists plus*' (Givón 2016, 682, emphasis in the original).

In this article, we discuss the legacy of structuralism with a focus on the presence of theoretical concepts and empirical analyses typical of structuralism in contemporary linguistics. We distinguish two perspectives on structuralism: in addition to taking into account contemporary linguistic schools of thought that have been explicitly founded on key notions of structuralism from their inception onwards, we will also pay attention to recent developments in linguistics that indicate a revival of structuralist concepts and analyses in frameworks that do not explicitly acknowledge any intellectual indebtedness to the structuralist tradition. We do not maintain that there currently is a conscious restoration of structuralist notions in contemporary linguistics, nor do we pretend that current linguistic frameworks fall short compared to the ones developed in the heyday of Structural Linguistics. We agree with most historians of

the language sciences that Structural Linguistics suffered from a number of shortcomings and is now justifiably considered obsolete as a paradigm (cf. Albrecht 2007, Ch. 10 for discussion). Structural Linguistics has moreover been surpassed, roughly since the 1970s, by frameworks which are often (though by no means always) more comprehensive and better attuned to the rich and diverse reality of language and language use. While it is our explicit aim to steer clear of any "kind of reactionary nostalgia for the certainties of an earlier age" (Sinha 2002, 275), what guides our enquiry is the observation that one can easily come across contemporary studies in linguistics in which concepts, distinctions, claims and analyses are put forward that are similar to what can be found in erstwhile structuralist accounts.

Before a comparison between some contemporary approaches in linguistics and the structuralist paradigm can be carried out, it is necessary to briefly recall the main characteristics of structuralism in linguistics (Section 2). We also specify which contemporary linguistic frameworks will be taken into consideration in our analysis, both with regard to accounts that are explicitly based on core tenets of structuralism and accounts that are not. We will then focus on five specific notions that played an important role in Structural Linguistics and continue to live on in current linguistics. The five specific issues we will discuss are the view that each language should be described in its own terms (Section 3), the claim that a distinction must be made between language-specific encoded meaning and non-language-specific meaning, viz. contextually and encyclopaedically enriched utterance meaning (Section 4), the view that in between the grammar of a language system and individual acts of discourse an intermediary level of 'normal language use' must be taken into account (Section 5), the claim that paradigmatic contrasts are of paramount importance to arrive at a coherent understanding of language systems (Section 6), and the conviction that language systems and norms are of an inherently intersubjective and social nature (Section 7). To conclude the article, we briefly address the general question of how modern linguistics can integrate still relevant structuralist insights by drawing on Hegel's notion of *Aufheben* ('sublation').

We add two caveats from the outset. First, we do not intend to contribute to the ongoing debate about the exact relationship between the historical figure of Ferdinand de Saussure and the historical movement called structuralism. Some scholars – in particular Jäger (1976, 1978, 2003, 2010); cf. also Rastier (ed., 2016) – have challenged the view that structuralism, understood as a framework based on a series of theoretical and methodological assumptions that emerged at the beginning **of** the twentieth century, developed the theory of language and linguistics outlined by Saussure in the *Cours de linguistique générale* (Saussure 1916/1922 [1975]); in the remainder of this article we refer to the critical edition by R. Engler, Saussure 1967–1968). This debate has demonstrated that Saussure and structuralism as a paradigm should not be confused with each other, neither historically nor conceptually. We will make sure that claims about structuralism and claims about Saussure are clearly distinguished in this article.

Second, in our exploration of the five aspects mentioned above, we will not address the distinction between an intuitionist approach to linguistics and what is now commonly known as a 'corpus-based approach', basically because the difference between these approaches is orthogonal to the issues we will discuss. Both intuitionist and corpus-based approaches can be found in nineteenth-century Historical and Comparative Linguistics as much as in twentieth-century Structural, Cognitive and Functional Linguistics. The difference between 'arm-chair linguistics' based on intuition and corpus-based linguistics cuts through all frameworks of the previous and current century to some extent and is not suited as a criterion that can be used to distinguish particular notions typical of different frameworks or to reveal the different theoretical and methodological assumptions of the frameworks we will focus on in this article.

2. Structuralism and contemporary linguistics

2.1 The basic assumptions of Structural Linguistics

As Van de Walle et al. (2006) point out, it has to be borne in mind that there have been several structuralist theories rather than one single structuralist theory (see Joseph this volume). Like all other modern linguistic frameworks, structuralism had many faces, which is not surprising given the international diversification of the paradigm in the twentieth century (see Newmeyer this volume, Jensen & Gregersen this volume). It is customary to distinguish, e.g., between European, North-American and Russian schools of structuralism, but there were also many scholars in other parts of the world who adhered to structuralist assumptions until well into the 1970s (cf. Albrecht 2007). However, although structuralism was not, as occasionally thought, a unitary paradigm, it is possible to pinpoint a number of basic assumptions which were shared by arguably most scholars who more or less expressly positioned themselves as representatives of structuralism. Following Van de Walle et al. (2006, 2–3), we would like to highlight the following five sets of assumptions.

a) "Structuralists tend to stress the autonomy of the language system *vis-à-vis* other aspects of language, such as sociological, psychological and pragmatic or discourse factors, which are considered 'external'" (Van de Walle et al. 2006, 3). A language system is a specific 'social system' (Joseph 1995, 225). A corollary of this view is that "there are as many particular systems as there are languages", which in turn translates into empirical analyses of linguistic phenomena that favour categorial particularism, as opposed to categorial universalism (cf. Lazard 2006).
b) A language-specific 'functional' system (*langue*) is based on relations which are foundational for the formal and semantic properties of the linguistic units between which these relations exist. This may be called the 'principle of anti-atomism' that was instrumental in forwarding the Saussurean approach to 'a language' after the publication of the *Cours de linguistique générale*

(Saussure 1916/1922 [1975]). The 'systematic' approach entails a relational, differential approach to linguistic signs. The linguistic sign is defined as a bilateral entity consisting of the inseparable juncture of a signified (*signifié*) and a signifier (*signifiant*), which entertains both paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations with other signs.

c) From a structuralist perspective, it is imperative to distinguish synchronic from diachronic analyses of language, which are considered two perspectives on language with far-reaching methodological consequences. Languages should moreover first be studied from a synchronic point of view, which has logical priority over the diachronic point of view. For Saussure in particular, the synchronic point of view corresponds to the knowledge speakers possess of a language understood as a system of linguistic signs (Van de Walle et al. 2006, 6), which does not preclude the possibility that speakers entertain opinions and judgments about historical features of their language.

d) Structuralism subscribes to the famous words in the *Cours de linguistique générale* (Saussure 1916/1922 [1975], 169) that language is not a 'substance' but a 'form'.[80] To the extent that 'form' can be taken to mean that a *langue* is a 'structure' and/or consists of structures (Van de Walle et al. 2006, 3), the structuralist focus on form entails that language should not be studied with the methodology of the natural sciences but by means of new, genuinely linguistic methods that are appropriate to its object of study. Already Saussure himself – who never used the term 'structuralism' – occasionally referred to 'structures', in particular the structure of words (Saussure 1967–1968, 278) and differences in

80. The assertion "la langue est une forme et non une substance" is actually an addition by the editors of the *Cours* (1916/1922), Ch. Bally and A. Sechehaye. Saussure himself entertained a more nuanced understanding of 'form' in language. He emphasised that 'form' and 'meaning' constitute an original synthesis in linguistic signs, separable only as a result of posterior analysis (see Saussure 1967–1968, 256–264 and Saussure 2011, 72, 104, 140–141, 148–149; cf. Jäger 1976, 1978 and Willems 2016a for discussions).

structure with regard to 'different types of language' (441) (cf. also Saussure 2011, 127).

e) Finally, in contrast to Bloomfield (1933) and post-Bloomfieldian structural linguists, who emphasised the study of linguistic forms (expressions) with as little regard as possible for substance (Van de Walle et al. 2006, 19, Newmeyer this volume), European structuralists such as Jakobson (1936 [1971]) and Hjelmslev (1935–1937, 1959) stressed the need to analyse meaning as an inherent aspect of language systems (cf. Jensen & Gregersen this volume). Meaning is considered by these structuralist scholars to be "not reducible to external factors or reference" (Van de Walle et al. 2006, 3). Meaning is furthermore amenable to an analysis in terms of functional oppositions that has been successfully applied to the domain of phonology in Prague structuralism (cf. Trubetzkoy 1939 [1958]).[81]

It is not possible to address the status of all these assumptions and points of view in contemporary linguistics in detail in this article. We will instead focus on five specific ideas that have loomed large in the history of Structural Linguistics and that we consider of particular relevance for our purpose to examine the traces of structuralism in contemporary linguistics (Sections 3 through 7). In accordance with the conceptual clarifications put forward under d) in this section, we will continue to use the terminological pair 'form' and 'meaning' to refer in general terms to the two sides of the bilateral linguistic sign. Hjelmslev (1943 [1961], §13) proposed to further differentiate Saussure's notions 'signified' and 'signifier' by combining the distinction between 'content' and 'expression' with

81. Hjelmslev does not model the analysis of grammar and the lexicon on the principles of phonology, but instead advocates an account of all aspects of language on the basis of general sets of categories that are not derived from the study of any specific level of language. This is actually one of the major aspects of the continuity between Hjelmslev's so-called preglossematic and glossematic periods, which is easily overlooked or underestimated (see Van de Walle 2009, 230–232; see also Cigana, this volume).

the distinction between 'form' and 'substance' and delimiting the four strata thus defined ('content-form' and 'content-substance', 'expression-form' and 'expression-substance') *vis-à-vis* the general layer of 'purport' (cf. Albrecht 2007, 141–144, Fudge 1995, Graffi this volume and Jensen & Gregersen this volume for brief overviews). In order not to complicate matters, we do not rely on Hjelmslev's further differentiations in this article.

2.2 Two complementary perspectives

As mentioned in the introduction, there are two main areas that are relevant for the study of the legacy of structuralism in current linguistics. First, several contemporary linguistic schools of thought express their allegiance to the structuralist tradition and continue to defend, albeit with important qualifications, structuralist ideas and assumptions.[82] Second, authors of different persuasions who often explicitly reject structuralism as a paradigm occasionally make claims, or rely on concepts, distinctions and methods, that are similar to what can be found in former structuralist accounts. The resulting analyses are reminiscent of notions that were once taken for granted in Structural Linguistics before largely falling into oblivion, but they apparently keep re-entering linguistic accounts by the back door. In this section, we briefly characterise both perspectives.

It is not our aim to provide an exhaustive list of the schools of thought and scholars that have explicitly adopted and further developed structuralist notions, either directly from Saussure or indirectly through early American or European (in particular Danish) Structuralism; compare, for example the work of Henry Gleason (1917–2007), Sydney Lamb (1929-) and Sebastian Shaumyan

82. We deliberately refrain from using the term 'neo-structuralist', which might cause confusion because of the lack of clear criteria for how to define and apply it. The term has been used to refer to a wide range of approaches, e.g. Wierzbicka's 'Natural Semantic Metalanguage', Pustejovsky's 'Generative Lexicon' and Fellbaum's 'WordNet' (cf. Geeraerts 2010, Ch. 4), which do not necessarily share basic assumptions about language. Some of these approaches even explicitly reject basic claims of classical Structuralism, e.g. about linguistic particularism or about the bilateralness of the linguistic sign (see also Section 4).

(1916–2007) in the United States, Alan Gardiner (1879–1963) in the United Kingdom, Emile Benveniste (1902–1976), André Martinet (1908–1999), Gustave Guillaume (1883–1960), Antoine Culioli (1924–2018) in France, Leo Weisgerber (1899–1985) in Germany, among many other scholars in the Soviet Union, Eastern and Southern Europe and South-America.[83] Moreover, while several linguistic frameworks in the second half of the twentieth century have been explicitly built on Structural Linguistics, e.g. the Columbia School of Linguistics (Kirsner 1979, Diver 1995), only a handful of them have been able to continue that effort until the present day. The frameworks that are particularly relevant to mention in the context of this article are Eugen Coseriu's (1921–2002) school of Integral Linguistics, alternatively known as the Tübingen School of linguistics (Coseriu 1958 [1974], 1962 [1975], 1985, 1987, 1992, 2001, 2007, Albrecht et al., eds. 1988, Stehl and Haßler, eds. 2017, Kabatek 2018, 2022, Willems and Munteanu, eds. 2021, among others), M.A.K. Halliday's (1925–2018) school of Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday 1973, 1978, 1995, Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, 2014, Martin 1992, Butler 2003, Taverniers 2011, among others) and the initiatives to revive, integrate and continue the school of Danish structuralism and the work of Louis Hjelmslev in particular (Rasmussen, ed. 1993, Piotrowski 1997, Vykypěl 2005, Zinna and Cigana, eds. 2017, among others).

Both Integral Linguistics and Systemic Functional Linguistics can be classified under the common denominator of 'structural-functional approaches.' They explicitly draw inspiration from structuralism, in the case of Integral Linguistics mostly from the work of Saussure, but also from Trubetzkoy, Hjelmslev, Jakobson, Bloomfield and Martinet (cf. Coseriu 1958 [1974]), in the case of Systemic Functional Linguistics mostly from the work of Hjelmslev and the Copenhagen School of linguistics and the work of J.R. Firth (1890–1960) and the London School of linguistics (cf. Halliday 1995, Taverniers 2011). At the same time, both frameworks pay due attention to the diversity and richness of language use, including discourse

83. See the various articles in Section X '20th Century Linguistics' of Koerner and Asher (eds. 1995) and Albrecht (2007, Ch. 4) for succinct overviews.

traditions and text linguistics (Kabatek 2018, 2022, Martin 1992). Integral Linguistics and Systemic Functional Linguistics not only incorporate many structuralist insights, but also go 'beyond structuralism' (Coseriu 2001, 109–115). The current initiatives to revive the school of Danish structuralism, on the other hand, remain closer to the original structuralist edifice of Hjelmslev and his school, while leaving room for innovation in domains such as linguistic change, connotation, linguistic norms and even mathematical linguistics. In addition to the overall similarities, these schools of thought also differ with regard to many aspects. In the ensuing sections we will make reference to some of these schools of thought and provide examples of the analyses they have put forward so as to bring out the points we consider revelatory of the legacy of structuralism in contemporary linguistics. For the sake of coherence, our focus will mainly be on European structural functionalism.

With regard to the second perspective, we will, for the purposes of this article, focus on frameworks that pertain to the broad paradigm of functionally oriented linguistics, in particular Cognitive Linguistics (Langacker 1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1999, 2007, Taylor 1999, 2002, 2003, 2012, Geeraerts and Cuyckens, eds. 2007) and Construction grammar (Fillmore 1988, Fillmore and Kay 1993, Goldberg 1995, 2006, Hoffmann and Trousdale, eds. 2013), Functional Typology (Dryer 1997, Evans and Levinson 2009, Haspelmath 2007, 2010, Matić and Wedgwood 2013), and a number of pragmatic approaches to language, in particular Neo-Gricean pragmatics (Atlas 1989, 2005, Bach 1994, 2010, Grice 1989, Levinson 2000). These various frameworks are undoubtedly highly diverse, both with regard to their historical background and their scope, aims and analyses. What makes it relevant to group them together is that all of them have little, if any, affinity for the structuralist tradition and yet frequently rely on structuralist notions in their investigations of linguistic phenomena.

None of these latter frameworks present themselves as being explicitly built on previous work in the structuralist tradition, but rather consider themselves to have left behind structuralism. Occasionally reference is made to structuralist ideas with a nod to structuralist precursors, for example as when cognitive gram-

marians maintain that the cognitive definition of the linguistic sign is "profoundly Saussurean in spirit" (Taylor 1999, 18–19), which is however based on an interpretation that glosses over considerations that were central to Saussure (cf. Willems 2011, 2016a). It is more common that concepts, distinctions and claims with a distinctly structuralist flavour are introduced without being acknowledged as having already a history in structuralist work. When surveying this type of structuralist aftermath, we will not only point out similarities but also address differences in approach. The legacy of structuralism in these frameworks should not be misconstrued as acts of historiographically informed restoration. It is important to keep in mind that similarity of concepts, distinctions, arguments and methods across periods of time and across different frameworks does not mean that they are identical. The disruption that took place in the decades after the heyday of structuralism should not be underestimated. This is why the issues on which we will focus are treated with equal attention to convergences and differences.

3. Structuralist notion no. 1: Each language should be described in its own terms

With the Chomskyan turn in linguistics, one of the guiding principles of structuralism, viz. that each language should be described in its own terms, came under severe criticism. Contrary to Structural Linguistics, Generative Grammar has been first and foremost interested in the principles of Universal Grammar (UG) and the constraints on parametric variation of linguistic structures across languages. The criticism was intimately associated with Chomsky's major charge that, like most nineteenth-century historical linguists, Saussure had effectively placed syntax outside the scope of linguistics proper (Chomsky 1972 [2006], 18). By contrast, many functionalist researchers who emphasise the importance of a multidisciplinary approach to language have explicitly reverted to the guiding principle that linguistic enquiry should not be driven by *a priori* formal assumptions regarding *Language*, but by the interest in the substantive variation encountered in particular *languages*.

In Integral Linguistics, it has been argued, for instance, that the syntax of Japanese cannot be adequately captured by relying on putative universal categories such as 'subject', 'object', 'active' and 'passive', which are well-established in the tradition of grammatical analysis of Indo-European languages. Japanese syntax should instead be analysed by relying on categories that capture the specificity of the Japanese language system. Japanese verbs are inflected for tense, aspect, mood, honorific relationship, etc., but not for person and number, and Japanese shows no agreement. Coseriu (1987, 96–118) links this finding to an analysis of verbal semantics and valency. He argues that Japanese does not have a 'subject' or 'direct object' in the common understanding of these terms, because Japanese verbs are fundamentally 'impersonal'. Coseriu (1987) goes on to argue that diathesis in Japanese cannot be understood in terms of the contrast between 'active' and 'passive' voice familiar from Indo-European languages. In fact, Japanese distinguishes two types of 'passive diathesis', viz. *judo* and *ukemi*, the latter being the original and historically older passive voice in Japanese. *Ukemi* in particular is characterised by various language-specific properties that cannot be subsumed under an Indo-European informed understanding of what passive diathesis is without distorting the relevant linguistic facts, according to Coseriu. This kind of particularist approach to linguistic categories does not prevent Coseriu from defining any linguistic category encountered in a specific language at the same time as a 'potential universal' in view of Language in general (Coseriu 1974 [1977]; see Willems 2016b for discussion).

The focus on language-particular categories is widely shared in contemporary Functional Typology. Functional Typology does not openly subscribe to a structuralist point of view, yet it adopts several ideas that are structuralist in spirit. For instance, in a widely discussed paper, Evans & Levinson (2009) argue against the generative view that all languages share a common blueprint (UG) or are built to a common plan. Differences between languages, the authors claim, are substantial and the true object of linguistics, viz. these differences are not reducible to the structures proposed by the restrictivist approach advocated by generative linguists. Most functional linguists nowadays share the view that the renewed focus

on language diversity and variation is to be applauded. What is less often recognised is that this focus dovetails with one of the basic claims of structuralism.[84]

Another particularly interesting case in point is the recent typologically informed criticism of the basic information structural category of 'focus' by Matić and Wedgwood (2013). In virtually every theory of information structure, the notion of focus plays a key role. Depending on the specific account, focus has been defined in various ways, for example as "indicator of alternatives" (Féry and Krifka 2008, 125) or as "the semantic component of a pragmatically structured proposition whereby the assertion differs from the presupposition" (Lambrecht 1994, 213). While it is generally acknowledged that the formal manifestations of focus can differ from language to language, potentially involving word order, morphology and prosody, the standard view in information structure research is to assume that the functional category of focus is a cross-linguistically stable category that is manifested in virtually every language. On the basis of a typological study of the many particular uses of focus constructions in languages around the world, Matić and Wedgwood (2013) challenge this view. They argue that by relying on a number of focus diagnostics, such as elicitation questions, it is possible to identify various 'focus constructions' in a sundry variety of languages in the world, but as soon as one takes a semasiological perspective and starts examining the so-called 'focus constructions' in more detail, it becomes clear that a universal notion of focus, regardless of how it is defined, does not do justice to the diversity and richness of the uses of the various focus constructions. For example, the Somali morpheme *baa* has been analysed as a focus particle because it is used in answer to standard elicitation tests for focus,

84. It also complies with a Humboldtian approach to language and linguistics, which places particular emphasis on language diversity (Trabant 1986, Coseriu 2015, II, Ch. 12). This approach had already been lent support before the publication of Saussure's Cours (1916) by the work of German-born anthropologist and linguist Franz Boas, who greatly influenced categorial particularism through his work on native American languages (Boas 1911). The work of Boas was instrumental in the development of American structuralism (cf. Hymes and Fought 1981, Fought 1995 and Kilarski 2021).

such as WH-questions that can elicit focus on particular constituents in the answer to such questions. Matić and Wedgwood (2013) point out that if *baa* is examined without the *a priori* assumption that it is purely a focus morpheme, then it is evident that *baa* has many other uses that have nothing to do with the category of focus. *Baa* can also be used to indicate a change of topic, to increase textual coherence and as a marker of realis mood. On the basis of similar cases, Matić and Wedgwood (2013) conclude that focus is at most 'a comparative concept' and not a 'language-particular category', in accordance with the conceptual distinction proposed by Haspelmath (2010). Under their view, a universal notion of focus is at most a useful tool for linguists to compare various related interpretational effects across languages, but not a category that captures aspects of the grammar of specific languages. In developing their analysis, Matić and Wedgwood (2013) thus adopt a strikingly structuralist perspective, without mentioning this explicitly.

Although contemporary Functional Typology sides with earlier structuralist research in emphasising language diversity and favouring categorial particularism, there are also substantial differences between both approaches. In the structuralist tradition, subscribing to the view that each language should be described in its own terms did not entail that generalisations across languages were ignored. For example, structural linguists already pointed out that language contact and cultural factors may affect structures across languages; compare, in particular, the seminal contributions to the study of areal linguistics by Trubetzkoy (1931), Jakobson (1931 [1962]), Bloomfield (1933, Ch. 19) and Coseriu (1955 [1975]), among others. However, the focus of structuralism with regard to cross-linguistic generalisations was on general principles of language structuring that were assumed to be universally applicable, in particular the systems of oppositions and paradigmatic contrasts that can be found both in phonology and grammar overall (cf. Section 6). By contrast, current functional typologists stress that universal properties of languages are not to be explained on language-internal grounds but in view of external 'universal-functional pressures' or 'general functional and cognitive principles', including processing constraints (Dryer 1997, Haspelmath 2007, Evans and Levinson 2009).

While the structuralist focus on systematic properties of grammar does not itself contradict the view that grammars are historically shaped by functional and cognitive principles, many functional and cognitive linguists associate the assumption of the vital role external functional pressures and cognitive principles play in language with the profoundly un-structuralist claim that the distinction between grammar (*langue*, the language system) and language use (*parole*) cannot be maintained. This is, as Newmeyer (1998) argues, an essential feature of the holistic 'usage-based approach' that dominates both current functional and cognitive linguistics. This particular point of view does not merely imply that linguistic analyses should be based on accounts of language use, but linguistic analyses can give up the very concept of *langue* or a language-specific grammar altogether, with all the circularity this involves (cf. already Silverstein 1981; see also Newmeyer 2003). For example, Taylor (2012) conceives of a language as a 'mental corpus', which amounts to equating knowledge of a language with a memorised repository of previous experiences with language, resulting in a hierarchically structured, interrelated network of linguistic units that are to various degrees schematic. Under this view, there is no place for *langue*-specific systematic contrasts in phonology, morphology and syntax as conceived by structuralists, just as there is no reason to bring out the specific differences between the grammars and lexicons of different languages other than the language variation in particular instances of language use. We will return to the structuralist distinction between *langue* and *parole* in Section 5.

The distinction between Structural Linguistics and the holistic, usage-based approach can also be linked to the debate concerning the relation between 'crosslinguistic concepts' and 'language-particular categories' already mentioned above (cf. Haspelmath 2007, 2010, Newmeyer 2010). The claim that language-particular generalisations and universal, cross-linguistic generalisations are virtually disconnected can only be upheld if it is assumed that the concepts used for cross-linguistic comparison are arbitrary artefacts of linguists. For example, this is evident in the assertion that focus merely is 'a heuristic tool' (Matic and Wedgwood 2013, 158–160). Under this view, the delimitation and definition of concepts advanced by

linguists for cross-linguistic comparison are not guided by the categories structurally encoded in particular language systems, which are ultimately considered unique, possibly idiosyncratic, but not potentially universal. Linguistic typology can accordingly dispense with 'language-particular categories,' and their formal and semantic description is not considered necessary in order to arrive at cross-linguistic generalisations. 'Semantic maps' are another case in point. Drawing 'semantic maps' allows functional typologists to compare how linguistic items partially overlap and partially differ in their uses, e.g. the prepositions *to* in English and *à* in French and the functionally partly similar dative case in German (Haspelmath 2003). The empirical analyses that lead to semantic maps draw on 'crosslinguistic concepts' with a view to compare languages from an onomasiological point of view. The functions displayed on the maps are general concepts that capture (typical) uses of linguistic items in various languages, they do not aim to capture the language-specific encoded signifieds of the items under study. By charting and comparing their 'multifunctionality' by means of concepts that are considered merely tools for typological enquiry, it is possible to sidestep the question how crosslinguistic concepts relate to the language-particular categories of the different languages – yet it is the knowledge of the various language-particular categories that informs the delimitation and definition of the different crosslinguistic concepts in the first place.

Thus, despite acknowledging that particular languages have their own categories, which is in accordance with the structuralist emphasis on studying languages in its own terms, the aims of Functional Typology and the former structuralist research agenda regarding linguistic generalisations are opposed to one another in this particular respect. Whereas structural linguists resorted to general principles of linguistic structuring to account in a systematic fashion for the irreducible cross-linguistic diversity of the world's languages, functional typologists draw on language-particular categories in order to show that diversity and variation are universally constrained by general functional and cognitive principles and processing constraints.

4. Structuralist notion no. 2: The distinction between language-specific signifieds and non-language-specific senses

Saussure pioneered the difference between language-specific signifieds (Fr. *signifiés*) grounded in a system of differing *valeurs* in the *langue* of a particular language, on the one hand, and the multifunctionality of the language-specific form-meaning pairings in *parole* (Saussure 1967–1968, 251–276).[85] The distinction was taken up by early European structuralists, in particular Trubetzkoy (1939 [1958]), Hjelmslev (1928, 1935–1937, 1943 [1961]), Reichling (1935), Jakobson (1936 [1971]), among others. It is in this context that Jakobson (1936 [1971]) introduced the notion *Gesamtbedeutung* and Hjelmslev (1935–1937) the notion *Grundbedeutung* (which he adopted from Wüllner 1827) with regard to grammatical signifieds. Full-fledged accounts of the language-specific structures of lexical signifieds were not developed until later, in particular by German scholars such as Jost Trier (1894–1970), Gunther Ipsen (1899–1984) and Walter Porzig (1895–1961) (*Wortfeldtheorie* 'semantic field theory') and American anthropological linguists like Ward Goodenough (1919–2013), Harold Conklin (1926–2016) and Floyd Lounsbury (1914–1998). These latter scholars developed componential semantic analyses similar to European accounts, with Uriel Weinreich (1926–1967) as an important figure for the explanation of the rationale underlying the concept of feature analysis. The European structuralist approach was continued, but gradually adapted to a less strict approach of signifieds in the work of Algirdas Greimas (1917–1992), Bernard Pottier (1924-), Luis Prieto (1926–1996) and several other structuralists (cf. Geckeler 1971, Coseriu and Geckeler 1974 and Lyons 1977, Ch. 8–9).

Among contemporary structural-functional approaches to language, Integral Linguistics continues to play the role of ardent defender of the need to observe the distinction between indefeasible language-specific signifieds, which are underspecified, and the con-

85. See Wunderli (1981), Joseph (2004), Willems (2016a), among others, for discussions. The difference is already addressed by Saussure at various places in De la double essence du langage (Saussure 2011).

textual and/or encyclopaedic enrichments signifieds undergo when linguistic signs are instantiated in specific instances of language use (cf. Coseriu 1970, 1987, 1992, Dietrich 1997, Willems 1994, 2011, Kabatek 2000, among others). Proponents of Integral Linguistics have defended this position time and again against criticisms from different quarters. As an example to illustrate this effort, recall the discussion about the meaning of the English verb *climb*, a word that has been much discussed in the literature. Fillmore (1982) adopts a cognitive approach to semantics and considers 'clambering' and 'ascending' as the two 'critical conditions' of the semantic prototype of *climb*. This entails that in non-prototypical uses either of the two conditions may be absent, but they may not both be absent. Compare *The snake climbed (up) the tree* but?*The snake climbed (down) the tree*.[86] Coseriu (1990 [2000], 28–29) argues that it is essential to distinguish the unitary language-specific encoded signified of the verb *climb* from its various instantiations depending on the contexts of use. While features such as 'ascending' and 'clambering' are adequate to characterise specific salient uses of the verb, they cannot be used to determine the language-specific encoded signified of *climb*. According to Coseriu, the signified of *climb* only specifies "on a vertical or inclined plane" (not 'up' nor 'down') and "with effortful use of extremitie" (not necessarily 'with limbs') (Coseriu 1990 [2000], 28). The semantic features that Coseriu proposes for the semantic paraphrase of the verb are not derived from its prototypical use(s) in discourse but established with a view to capture the unitary signified that licenses prototypical and non-prototypical senses alike.

In a similar vein, Van der Gucht et al. (2007) show that the language-specific encoded signified of the English preposition *over* is a unitary combinatorial meaning ('instrumental meaning' in the terminology of Coseriu 1987, 149) that can be paraphrased as "positioning of X *vis-à-vis* a reference point Y which is inferior to X", while various more specific uses of the preposition belong to a level

86. Alternative analyses along similar lines were proposed by Jackendoff (1990), Wierzbicka (1990) and Taylor (2003, 108–111). See Hanks (2013, 99–101) for a brief overview and yet another analysis in accordance with prototype theory, albeit in terms of preferential and probabilistic features.

of non-language-specific referential functions. De Cuypere (2013) argues that the language-specific encoded signified of the English preposition *to* should historically be paraphrased as "establisher of relationship between X and reference point Y'. More specific uses, such as 'temporal boundary', e.g. in *She worked from dawn to dusk*, and 'addressee', e.g. in *She talked to him*, are analysed as contextually and conceptually enriched senses. A similar account has recently been provided for the preposition *with* in English and its counterparts in German, Swedish and French by Widoff (2021). Recent work in the context of Integral Linguistics has thus made a strong case for observing the difference between language-specific encoded signifieds and the much more specialised non-language-specific referential functions ('senses') to which linguistic signs – i.e. form–meaning pairings of language-specific signifiers with language-specific signifieds – are put to use. According to this line of research, the difference between the meaning that is given in a particular language system and the meaning that is constructed in a speech act, which involves reference to some object of discourse, is key to a coherent approach to natural language semantics, in line with one of Structural Linguistics' basic assumptions.

This distinction was not retained in many frameworks (at least not in the sense intended by Saussure and many of his structuralist followers in Europe), which nevertheless adopted the originally structuralist method of componential analysis. The feature analysis Katz and Fodor (1963) and Katz and Postal (1964) developed as part of their Generative Semantics extended the componential approach to all traits that play a role in the interpretation of lexical items in context, disregarding whether the trait is an encoded language-specific feature or not (cf. Geckeler 1971, 433–444 for discussion). Lehrer (1974), too, proposed an approach to lexical fields in which language-specific signifieds are no longer distinguished from other components of meaning as a matter of principle. The same holds true for more recent accounts, for example Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic Metalanguage and Pustejovsky's Generative Lexicon. In these accounts, language-specific semantic features and encyclopaedic features are conflated with a view to map out a theory of disambiguation and interpretation of words in context. This conflation

goes hand in hand with an explicit universalist claim regarding the features put forward in the componential analyses. It is assumed that language-specific meanings can in large part be reduced to universal features. This claim is very explicit in a framework such as Wierzbicka's (1972, 1996) Natural Semantic Metalanguage, while it remains implicit in Pustejovsky's (1995) Generative Lexicon model (cf. Willems 2011 and 2013 for discussion).

Cognitive linguists, on the other hand, usually reject componential semantic analysis altogether and instead favour semantic analyses in terms of prototypes or prototypicality effects, mental spaces and idealised cognitive models and frames (cf. Kleiber 1990, Blank 1997, Geeraerts 1997, 2010). These notions reflect the holistic approach to meaning cognitive linguists endorse. It focuses on the conceptual nature of meaning, broadly construed, rather than on disentangling language-specific signifieds from the enriched conceptual representations in language use. In Cognitive Linguistics it has moreover been claimed that distinguishing between language-specific and non-language-specific features of meaning is either irrelevant or not feasible (Langacker 1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1999, Fillmore 1982, 1985, Taylor 2002, 2003, 2012, Geeraerts 2010, Geeraerts and Cuyckens, eds. 2007). The main argument is that there are no cut-and-dried, broadly applicable procedures to separate the two kinds of features, all the more so because speakers consistently rely on encyclopaedic knowledge for the necessary enrichment of any meaning in discourse. For instance, Langacker writes:

> Certainly an autonomous semantics [...] can be formulated, but the account it offers of the meanings of the linguistic expressions is apt to be so restricted and impoverished relative to the full richness of how we actually understand them that one can question its utility and cognitive reality. (Langacker 1987, 155)

Similarly, Fillmore's model of Frame Semantics, which aims to be a "semantics of understanding" (Fillmore 1985, 222) that promotes the perspective of the hearer/listener (as contrasted to the perspective of the speaker), is based on the assumption that linguists should determine "cognitive structures (or 'frames'), knowledge of which

is presupposed for the concepts encoded by the words" (Fillmore and Atkins 1992, 75). Language is viewed as "a repository of world knowledge" (Geeraerts 1997, 8) and semantics should consequently be "broadly encyclopaedic in scope" (Taylor 2002, 21; 2003, Ch. 5). This also entails that "pragmatics is fully subsumed into a semantic characterization" (Taylor 2002, 104) in order to arrive at a cognitively 'realistic' account of meaning.

Despite reluctance to acknowledge it, the distinction between language-specific signifieds and the broadly encyclopaedic content of language in discourse has never been completely abandoned in the linguistic frameworks that have little or no affinity for the structuralist tradition, even if it was largely consigned to the status of an unresolved issue of semantic theory. This situation may have contributed to a change of heart among some linguists, who in the last two decades have become increasingly aware of the theoretical and empirical problems the holistic approach to meaning pose. An important indication of this change is that the conceptual distinction between 'encoded meaning' and 'pragmatic sense' is being taken seriously in an increasing number of studies. This is particularly conspicuous in current Neo-Gricean pragmatics, but also in recent work conducted by a number of cognitive linguists.

In the work of Neo-Gricean pragmatists, the distinction between underspecified encoded meanings and the enriched pragmatic senses that can be found in actual discourse figures prominently. For example, Atlas (1989, 2005) argues that the encoded meaning of the English numeral *three* is fundamentally underspecified, whereas specific uses of the numeral such as 'exactly 3', 'at least 3' and 'at most 3' are in his account pragmatic senses rather than encoded meanings. While the distinction between encoded meanings and pragmatically enriched senses has been around since the inception of Neo-Gricean Pragmatics and is shared by virtually all its adherents, it must be pointed out that in this framework encoded meaning is not necessarily conceived of as being language-specific. Only in the work of a few authors, e.g. Levinson (2000), meanings are seen as language-specific, but the language-specific nature of encoded meaning is not an issue in the seminal work of Grice (1913–1988) (1989) and other Neo-Gricean pragmatists such as Atlas (1989, 2005)

and Bach (1994, 2010). In the related approach of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Carston 2002, Carston and Hall 2012), too, the distinction between encoded meanings and pragmatically enriched senses abstracts away from the language-specificity of the encoded meanings. Thus, whereas for Structural Linguistics and a number of structural-functional approaches the assumptions of encoded meaning and language-specific meaning are intrinsically connected, this is not the case for most contemporary pragmatic approaches to language (cf. Belligh and Willems 2021 for discussion). This shows that the distinction between encoded meaning and pragmatic senses and the distinction between language-specific and encyclopaedic, broadly conceptual aspects of meaning are orthogonal distinctions that can be combined in various ways, depending on the framework.

Some cognitive linguists have recently maintained that semantics and pragmatics ought not be conflated, for example Langacker (2007, 431–432) and Evans (2009, 2015), among others. Whereas Langacker (1987, 155) initially rejected "an autonomous semantics" on the ground that the account it offers of meanings is too "impoverished" and does not reflect any "cognitive reality", in some recent publications he claims that the "encyclopedic view of linguistic semantics" does not forego the semantics/pragmatics distinction even if it is still considered "largely artifactual" (Langacker 2007, 432). He even claims that his position is actually "quite close to the one Levinson espouses", at the same time criticising Levinson for "egregious misunderstandings" of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 2007, 451, n. 14). Langacker then reiterates the major cognitivist claims that follow from the "encyclopedic view of linguistic semantics" and the rejection of the semantics/pragmatics distinction (2007, 431–438), to which Levinson's semantic theory is opposed (Levinson 2000, 21), without further discussion or analysis.

Other cognitive linguists have gone so far as to reintroduce the Saussurean distinction between meaning in the *langue* and meaning in *parole*, claiming that both have to be kept apart, e.g. Geeraerts (2015). However, the two Saussurean notions are still interpreted according to the holistic view of meaning. For instance, according to Geeraerts (2015, 242), whenever a polyseme is uttered or interpreted,

"only a subset of features is activated". A similar account of 'making' meaning in terms of feature selection is advocated by Hanks (2013). Accounting for the specific sense a lexical item (or any linguistic sign, for that matter) takes on in language use in this way effectively constitutes a relapse into the pattern of feature analysis found in early Generative Semantics, which also construed interpretation or utterance meaning in terms of feature selection (cf. Katz and Fodor 1963, 188, 199–202). The reification of semantic features as traits among which a selection can be made on particular occasions of language use is alien to a Structural Semantics that takes into account Saussure's distinction between a word's encoded signified and its various instantiations in context (cf. Saussure 1967–1968, 259–264; Saussure 2011, 148–154, 191–192). Hjelmslev (1943 [1961], 46) already called attention to the "purely operative" nature of so-called components in semantic analysis, which Hjelmslev termed 'figurae' (compare also Bloomfield 1933, 145–146). Moreover, Coseriu (2001, 355–369) expressly calls attention to the fact that distinctive features in componential analyses must not be construed as 'building blocks' of language-specific signifieds:

> Primary lexical items correspond to unitary intuitions, they are by no means the product of an assembly of distinctive features that are already given. They present distinctive features only because they entertain oppositions with other lexical items: distinctive features exist by virtue of oppositions, not the other way round. (Coseriu 2001, 364; our translation)

Language-specific encoded meanings can be analysed in terms of features, but these features do not in turn constitute encoded meanings. Feature selection is thus ruled out as an explanatory mechanism in structural-functional approaches because it assumes (explicitly or implicitly) that the features are already present 'before' the signifieds.

Contemporary research in pragmatics and psycholinguistics stresses the importance of 'meaning construction' based on general, unitary but underspecified meanings (cf. Atlas 1989, 2005 and Frisson 2009, 2015). These accounts have for their part not drawn

on componential analysis. It is a matter of future research to determine how these strands of research can be combined to overcome the drawbacks of the feature selection paradigm and to present more realistic accounts of how enriched senses in context relate to language-specific encoded signifieds which underdetermine the referential and inferential processes in language use.

To conclude this section, it is worthwhile to discuss a recent development in current research on alternating constructions in morphosyntax. As is well known, many pairs of constructions alternate in the expression of a specific function. Famous examples include the genitive alternation, e.g. *John's shoes* and *the shoes of John*, the dative alternation, e.g. *She gave him the book* and *She gave the book to him*, and the particle placement alternation, e.g. *They picked up the key* and *They picked the key up*. The standard approach to deal with alternations such as these in the framework of Construction Grammar has been to analyse both structures as constructions in their own right, whereas the alternation is regarded as an epiphenomenon of the fact that the two constructions partially overlap in their uses (cf. Goldberg 1995, 2006 and much related work). More recently, Cappelle (2006) proposed an alternative approach, suggesting that it might be appropriate to analyse pairs of alternating constructions as 'allostructions', similar to treating variants of phonemes and morphemes as allophones and allomorphs in Structural Linguistics. Allostructions, then, are more 'filled-in' instantiations of an underlying, general and schematic constructional pattern, a so-called 'constructeme' (Perek 2015, 154). Cappelle's (2006) proposal is to be situated firmly within the context of Construction Grammar, but it obviously draws on a well-evidenced insight from structuralist phonology and morphology.

Cappelle (2006) elaborated on the formal aspects of the underspecified constructeme while leaving the question of the nature of its meaning unresolved. This question was subsequently taken up by Perek (2015), but Perek's analysis is couched in terms of the cognitive approach to semantics typical of Construction Grammar and does not differentiate between structurally encoded, language-specific meaning and pragmatically enriched senses. A number of studies from the perspective of Integral Linguistics fur-

ther addressed the semantics of the underspecified constructeme in relation to the more fleshed out senses that are associated with the allostructions (De Vaere et al. 2018, 2020, 2021). De Vaere et al. take the constructeme/allostructions distinction as an occasion to present the distinction between language-specific encoded meaning and pragmatic sense in a new light. In their view, the difference between a constructeme and allostructions must acknowledge the pivotal status of semantic invariance in the analysis. Since linguistic structures, viz. phonological and morphological units, but also words and syntactic patterns, are always instantiated as variants in discourse, it is necessary to establish their invariant systematic properties on a level of abstraction that does not prejudge in any way the creative use of the linguistic structures.[87] De Vaere et al. (2018, 2020, 2021) argue that the meanings of the constructeme and the allostructions should be aligned with the distinction between an invariant language-specific encoded signified and the conceptual variation of its instantiations in a corpus. For example, for the German ditransitive alternation, i.e. the alternation between the Indirect Object Construction, e.g. *Kanada will den Vereinigten Staaten Erdgas verkaufen* [Canada wants to sell natural gas to the United States], and the Prepositional Object Construction, e.g. *Motorola will eine Lizenz an Texas Instruments verkaufen* [Motorola wants to sell a licence to Texas Instruments], the authors propose an underlying 'AGENT–THEME–GOAL' constructeme with a schematic argument structure and a schematic 'three-placed transfer' meaning that is paradigmatically anchored in the grammar of German. By contrast, the meanings of the two allostructions, with either a dative NP or a prepositional phrase, include uses such as 'caused motion', 'caused possession', 'concrete transfer', 'abstract transfer' and 'propositional transfer'. These specific uses are pragmatically enriched senses that cannot be reduced to the invariant, unitary signified of the constructeme. However, although the meanings of the allostructions are pragmatically enriched, rather than semantically encoded, they do not constitute nonce-interpretations but are shown to be reg-

87. On the relation between the 'concrete' reality of variants and linguistic 'abstraction', see in particular Coseriu (1958 [1974], Ch. 2).

ularly recurring pragmatic meanings (De Vaere et al. 2020). The distinction between regularly recurring uses and one-off uses can be subsumed under another structuralist distinction, viz. between 'normal language use' and 'individual acts of discourse', to which we turn in the next section.

5. Structuralist notion no. 3: The distinction between a language system, normal language use and individual acts of discourse

Any possible revival of the Saussurean distinction between *langue* and *parole* is not without difficulties. It encounters the same kind of problems as when it was first launched by Saussure. A major problem is that the distinction between *langue* and *parole* is easily presented as a dichotomy, as if the distinction concerned two different linguistic phenomena that not only have an autonomous existence of their own, but that also are two impenetrable and separate spheres which are only connected to each other by virtue of instantiation: the abstract, social, intersubjectively shared *langue* is taken to be realised in the concrete, individual activity of *parole*. Such an interpretation cannot be upheld without important qualifications. This issue was already addressed by structuralist scholars from the Copenhagen and Prague schools.

The first structuralist scholar who was particularly concerned with the mediation and transitions between *langue* and *parole* was Louis Hjelmslev (1899–1965). Hjelmslev dealt with this issue in his preglossematic period (cf. Hjelmslev 1928 and 1935–1937) but also in his later writings.[88] Hjelmslev replaces Saussure's dichotomy by a complex four-tiered model which adds important distinctions to Saussure's binary model of abstract *langue* and instantiating *parole*. *Langue* is differentiated by Hjelmslev into 'schema', or 'pure form', i.e. differential values by virtue of mutual relations within the system regardless of any material realisation, and *norme*, i.e. the abstract,

88. There are differences in emphasis in the preglossematic account and the glossematic one, but these do not concern us here. For discussion see Van de Walle (2009, Ch. 5 and 11) and Jensen (2015).

socially defined *formes matérielles* of linguistic units. Conversely, *parole* is differentiated into *usage*, i.e. the conventionalised, habitualised realisation of units adopted by the members of a speech community in their linguistic activity, and *acte*, i.e. the individual speech activity of utterance (Hjelmslev 1943b, 32–38). Differentiations such as these introduce a layered approach to language that allows for a more fine-grained and more realistic account of (the relation between) language and language use.

While the application of Hjelmslev's model to concrete linguistic phenomena may pose difficulties, a comparable three-levelled model introduced by Trubetzkoy (1890–1938) in the introduction to his *Grundzüge der Phonologie* (1939 [1958], 10–12) is considerably easier to apply. When discussing the aims and tasks of a coherent Structural Phonology as opposed to a phonetic description of speech sounds, Trubetzkoy takes issue with Zwirner's phonometry (Zwirner and Zwirner 1936). According to Trubetzkoy, phonometrical analyses are useful to determine mean variations, i.e. 'norms' in the realisation of the phonemes of a language in a population of speakers. There is, however, no path from such quantitative analyses to the establishment of the phonological system of a particular language because phonemes do not differ from each other in terms of quantity but qualitatively in terms of 'functional' oppositions. At the same time, Trubetzkoy concedes that the phonometrical study of variation in the production of speech sounds is important, not only to establish what can be considered the 'normal' realisation of specific speech sounds across speakers of a linguistic community, but also to determine the realisation norms the individual speaker adheres to with regard to different speech situations (*Gesprächssituationen*, 1939 [1958], 12). Trubetzkoy thus establishes, with regard to phonology and phonetics, a plausible tripartite distinction between phonemes in the language system, 'normal' realisations of sounds and the unique sound realisations in actual speech as an alternative to Saussure's dichotomy between *langue* and *parole*. While the phonetic properties of speech sounds in *parole* are related to the phonemes, which must be determined on the basis of oppositions in the functional system of the *langue*, it is important not to construe the sounds found in *parole* as an undifferentiated set of individually realised phonetic

manifestations. On the contrary, *parole* encompasses specific habits, 'norms', which depend on conventionalised realisations of speech sounds according to specific criteria of language use that have to be accounted for, even though such normal realisations are not to be mistaken for phonemes in the *langue*. Trubetzkoy outlines in considerable detail the objectives of a stylistics of speech sounds (*Lautstilistik*, 1939 [1958], 17–29). Even though falling outside the purview of phonology proper, such a stylistics of speech sounds should embark on the vast task of establishing how, for example, emotive and conative speech (i.e. emotions and appeal, cf. Bühlers 'Organon model', Bühler 1934, 1990) are commonly realised by means of speech sounds.

The most elaborate theory of 'normal language use' to date has been developed in the structural-functional framework of Integral Linguistics. Drawing on the work of Copenhagen and Prague structuralists, Coseriu makes a strong case for why linguistics needs to overcome Saussure's dichotomy (Coseriu 1952 [1975], 1958 [1974], 46–51).[89] In Integral Linguistics, 'norm' or 'normal language use' designates an intermediary level of language which allows us to take into account linguistic facts that go beyond purely oppositional features of *langue*. The central claim is that there are, between individual acts of *parole* and systematic *langue*, traditional, non-distinctive realisations of *langue* within speech communities. One of Coseriu's examples to illustrate this is the Spanish vowel system. There are only five oppositional vowel phonemes in Spanish, i.e. /a/, /e/, /i/, /o/, and /u/, but speakers of Spanish 'normally' realise the first /e/ in a word like *verde* ('green') as an open vowel and the second /e/ as a closed vowel ([vɛrde]). Any other realisation would be possible and understood by hearers (as long as it remains within phoneme boundaries), but it would not be considered 'normal' (Kabatek 2020, 128).

In several of his publications, Coseriu demonstrates the importance of the threefold distinction, not only with respect to matters of

89. See Jensen (2015) for a comparison of the concept of 'norm' in the work of Coseriu and Hjelmslev, and Kabatek (2020) for a brief presentation of Coseriu's theory of norms in language.

form, but also with regard to meaning. Regarding lexical semantics, Coseriu explains the role of normal language use by pointing out that the normal meaning of compounds, i.e. the conventionalised interpretation among the members of a speech community, should not be confused with their language-specific encoded signified. It is, for instance, a matter of normal language use that the German compounds *Goldwaage* and *Straßenhändler* are generally used to refer to a 'balance to weigh gold' and a 'street vendor', respectively. In accordance with German word formation rules, these compounds could just as well be used to refer to a 'balance made of gold' or a 'person who deals in streets'. Alternative readings such as these are not ruled out on the basis of the rules of word formation in the German language system, even if they might be exceptional (Coseriu 1970; cf. Willems 1994, 2019). The same argument holds with regard to syntax. For example, Coseriu disagrees with Fillmore's (1968) well-known analysis of the two English sentences (1) and (2) in terms of a difference in semantic roles:

(1) John broke the window.

(2) A hammer broke the window.

According to Fillmore (1968, 25), the subject of the sentence is an AGENT in (1) but an INSTRUMENT in (2). According to Coseriu, the subject in English sentences such as (1) and (2) structurally encodes the same semantic role, which however is underspecified and does not differentiate between the roles of AGENT and INSTRUMENT. Whether *John* and *a hammer* actually perform the act of breaking or are used as instruments cannot be determined on the basis of the syntactic patterns instantiated in (1) and (2). There is nothing in the grammar of the English language system that prevents us, for example, from interpreting (1) in such a way that *John* is thought of as an INSTRUMENT, which is the default interpretation of *a hammer* in (2), but not of *John* in (1) (Coseriu 1970, 109, Coseriu 1987, 179, see Willems 2020 and Höllein 2021 for detailed accounts). Hence, AGENT is not a structurally encoded semantic role in the grammar of English, but a denotational function of normal language use (and the same holds for INSTRUMENT).

In other languages the situation is different, for example in an ergative language such as Hindi. Compare (1)-(2) with (3)-(4):

(3)	LaDakii=ne	khiDakii=ko	toD	di-yaa
	boy-ERG	window-ACC	break	give-PERF.SG.MASC

"The boy broke the window."

(4)	KhiDakii	hathauDa=se	TuuT	ga-yii
	window-NOM	hammer=INS	break	go-PERF.SG.FEM

≈ "The window broke due to the hammer."

With the transitive verb *ToD-naa* 'to break' in (3), the direct object *khiDakii=ko* 'the window' is in the accusative case and the AGENT subject *laDakii=ne* 'the boy' is in the ergative case. By contrast, with the intransitive verb *TuuT-naa* 'to get broken' in (4), *khiDakii* 'the window' is the subject in the nominative case and 'the hammer' is in the instrumental case (*hathauDa=se*) (cf. De Hoop & Narasimhan 2008, 66). Using a construction with the subject 'a hammer' in the ergative case (*hathauDa=ne*), the transitive verb *ToD-naa* and the object 'a window' in the accusative would not be ungrammatical but highly unusual. It would entail that the hammer is coerced into the role of AGENT, which in Hindi turns out to be a structurally encoded semantic role, unlike in English. Not surprisingly, with inanimate subjects an ergative construction is considerably more natural if the subject refers to a natural force, e.g. lightning (*biclii=ne*), than to a hammer or a stone (Saartje Verbeke, c.).

Several authors working within the framework of Integral Linguistics have followed the same lead and applied the distinction between 'system', 'normal language use' and 'individual acts of discourse' to various phenomena in lexical semantics, word formation, syntax, alternating argument structure constructions and contrastive linguistics (Willems 1994, 2001, Dietrich 1997, 2021, Kabatek 2000, Coene and Willems 2006, Willems and Willems 2010, Belligh 2020a, 2020b, Belligh and Crocco 2022, Widoff 2021, Höllein 2021, among others). In Romance linguistics in particular, the introduction of

the concept of 'discourse traditions', which are characteristic of texts, genres and registers, has been instrumental in further developing and refining Coseriu's layered theory of linguistic competence (Koch and Oesterreicher 1985, 2012). Importantly, Coseriu has shown that different types of norms play a role according to the level of language that is the subject of analysis. Whereas i) general laws of thinking, logic, world knowledge etc. are norms of any linguistic activity in general and ii) idiomatically correct language use is guided by the norms that define the speech traditions that hold in a linguistic community, speakers also conform to iii) what is conventionally considered adequate and appropriate in specific communicative situations, discourses and the production of various kinds of texts. These latter issues touch on historical speech practices in linguistic communities that are differentiated beyond the Saussurean dichotomy between *langue* and *parole* (cf. Oesterreicher 2001, Kabatek 2021).

The general acceptance of the role of 'normal language use' in language may have suffered from the fact that the term 'norm' is liable to cause confusion. It is often used to refer to a prescriptive standard of language behaviour, rather than being used in a descriptive sense to denote a traditional way of instantiating the systematic resources ('possibilities') of a particular *langue*.[90] The possible confusion that might arise is unfortunate because the insights that undergird the theory of descriptive norms such as it was developed in the tradition sketched out above may be key to several issues that are currently raised in linguistic pragmatics (including historical pragmatics), text linguistics, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, conversation analysis, linguistic anthropology, and so forth. In order to successfully pursue this line of enquiry, an important remark already made by Coseriu (1958 [1974], 1962 [1975]) is in order. We have to remind ourselves that the traditional modelling of language use (*parole*) in terms of 'instantiating' the underlying grammar (*langue*) is easily misconstrued as a relationship between a static, seemingly immutable system and an infinitely

90. Hjelmslev's notion of 'norm' actually straddles both approaches to norms in language (Van de Walle 2009, 168–172).

variable, heterogeneous series of individual performances. Yet, an underlying grammar is ever-changing as well: the relationship of *langue* underpinning actual speech (*parole*), mediated by normal language use, is a dynamic process which is grounded in the activity of speaking itself. After all, a *langue* is not an object that is being used in speech but the incessantly renewed 'historical manifestation' (Coseriu 1962 [1975], 256–258 and 1983) of a continuous process of creation and re-creation by speakers and hearers who instantiate the units, rules and procedures of linguistic activity according to the traditions laid down in their languages.[91]

The structuralist concept of 'normal language use' has not only been applied by scholars working in the context of Integral Linguistics but was also partly adopted by other scholars in the 1970s and 1980s who otherwise rejected most structuralist principles and methods. Several authors have put forward a number of arguments for revising dichotomous distinctions such as *langue* and *parole*, 'competence' and 'performance' or 'grammar' and 'usage', which also seem to hark back to the preoccupation with norms among structuralists, if only implicitly or tacitly. Whereas Bartsch (1985, 1987) restricts 'norms' to guidelines of communication as part of her overall pragmatic theory of language developed in critical response to Chomsky's theory of language, Newmeyer (2003) provides a thoughtful discussion of why he thinks that the Saussurean position with respect to *langue* and *parole* should be maintained. While acknowledging that grammars have been shaped in the course of time by "processing considerations – that is, by language in use" (2003, 684), Newmeyer shows that mainstream cognitive us-

91. Recall that we use langue and 'language-specific' in the sense explained in Section 4, viz. referring to a particular language system. In a more encompassing sense 'a language' can also be characterised by specific normal language usages, e.g. in pronunciation, the use of specific syntactic constructions, the realisation and occurrence of particular word formation procedures, etc. Under such a view, 'a language' is not only 'a language system' but the combination of a language system with particular traditions of 'normal language use' in a specific linguistic community. Cf. Coseriu (1975 [1952]) and (1979, 45–59) for the difference between a narrow and a broad definition of 'language' and the consequences that ensue for the coherence of a three-layered linguistic analysis.

age-based models of grammar and stochastic models of grammar often run into trouble by assuming that the distinction between 'knowledge of language' and 'use of language' is wrongheaded. As much as he emphasises the importance of Saussure's separation of *langue* and *parole*, Newmeyer recognises that language use frequently displays characteristics that are not systematic. For instance, actual discourse is rife with incomplete sentences, in particular sentences that lack the expression of an argument required by the verb's valency. This observation does not contradict the assumption that the corresponding grammatical representation of such sentences is fully specified, according to Newmeyer (2003, 689), but incomplete utterances are an illustration of the fact that "knowledge of grammatical structure is only one of many systems that underlie usage" (692). Coherent discourse obviously hinges on several other systems besides grammar, and it does so in regular ways. Preferences in discourse may be recurrent, even across languages, but neither does this entail that they are part of grammar nor that the distinction between grammar and usage is to be done away with. According to Newmeyer (2003), this also holds for linguistic content: "Grammar is such a poor reflection of usage because we have many more meanings to convey than could ever be supported by our grammatical resources in a reasonable period of time" (693). In other words, speakers are guided by 'norms' that are not encoded in the grammars of their languages but manifest themselves habitually in actual speech. Rather than invalidating the distinction between *langue* and *parole*, the recurrence of such norms in actual speech on the contrary underscores its importance, on the condition that both *langue* and *parole* are defined in such a way that they refer to clearly delimited interrelated parts of language as object of enquiry (Coseriu 1952 [1975], 43–93, 1979, 45–59, 1985, 2007, 70–75; cf. also Schlieben-Lange 1975, 9–20).

It is with regard to recurrent patterns of linguistic content that arguably the most elaborate theory of normal language use not seeking any affiliation with a structuralist school of thought has been developed in recent decades. We are referring here to Stephen Levinson's (1947-) Neo-Gricean theory of Generalised Conversational Implicatures (Levinson 2000). In this theory, two of Grice's

conversational maxims, viz. the maxim of quantity and the maxim of manner, are deployed to account for meanings of utterances which go beyond that which is structurally encoded in the lexicon and grammar of a language. Despite containing not a single reference to the structuralist theories of normal language use, Levinson's theory is centrally concerned with developing a sophisticated account of utterance meanings in a way that is in many respects similar to the layered approach discussed earlier in this section. For an extensive comparison of Levinson's three-levelled account of meaning with the three-layered approach to language in Integral Linguistics, we refer the reader to Belligh and Willems (2021). Here we briefly point out some of the specifics of Levinson's approach and illustrate its main tenets by means of a few examples.

Whereas Coseriu's conceptual pair 'normal language use' / 'individual acts of discourse' primarily differentiates Saussure's *parole* by disentangling the unique properties of individuals' speech and those formal and semantic structures in utterances that are traditional, recurrent and more or less firmly established according to various diasystematic conditions of language use, Levinson's approach is more narrowly focused on the meaning of syntagmatic structures and revolves around Grice's (1989) distinction between 'what is said' and 'what is implicated' (Levinson 2000, 13). If we take the level of the sentence as object of enquiry, then the tripartition amounts to distinguishing i) encoded sentence meaning, ii) 'utterance-type meaning' by virtue of 'default inferences' on the basis of Generalised Conversational Implicatures and iii) 'utterance-token meaning' characterised by the particularities of every single speech act, including once-off inferences (Levinson 2000, 22). The second layer of default inferences corresponds, *mutatis mutandis*, to the level of normal language use. Not surprisingly, Levinson uses the word 'normal' when he specifies this intermediate layer, which

> is a level of systematic pragmatic inference based not on direct computations about speaker-intentions but rather on general expectations about how language is *normally* used. These expectations give rise to presumptions, default inferences, about both content and force [...]. (Levinson 2000, 22, emphasis added)

For instance, compounds such as *bread knife*, *kitchen knife* and *steel knife* are semantically general expressions whose meanings are narrowed down only because their structural simplicity prompts us to interpret them in a stereotypical manner, that is, to refer to a knife 'used for' cutting bread, 'used in' the kitchen and 'made from' steel. It would be erroneous to think of these conventional interpretations as structurally encoded meanings. Likewise, inferences such as 'p and then q', 'p caused q', 'John intended p to cause q' are normal enrichments of the meaning of a sentence such as *John turned the switch and the motor started*, but there is nothing in the grammar of the English language encoded to that effect (Levinson 2000, 37–38). Examples such as these show that in Levinson's account speech fundamentally depends on inferences on the basis of normal language use, an observation that has meanwhile become quite commonly accepted in linguistic pragmatics and some other frameworks – but many linguistic circles have yet to follow suit. The kind of inference involved has been described as a Generalised Conversational Implicature by Levinson (2000), but whether or not such implicatures lie at the basis of utterance-type meaning has been controversial in Neo-Gricean Pragmatics and Relevance Theory. Alternative accounts of utterance-type meaning have been proposed, in the form of a theory of 'explicature' in Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Carston and Hall 2012) and a theory of 'impliciture' by Bach (1994, 2010). The theoretical differences between these accounts do not interest us here (see Belligh and Willems 2021).

To conclude this section, we briefly mention the altogether different notion of 'normal language use' that informs Hanks' Norms and Exploitations model (Hanks 2013). The model is rooted in the author's extensive experience as a lexicographer and combines insights and assumptions from corpus linguistics (especially John Sinclair's approach), Systemic Functional Linguistics, Cognitive Linguistics (especially prototype theory) and Grice's theory of conversational maxims. A norm is defined by Hanks (2013, 92) as "a pattern of ordinary usage in everyday language" or alternatively as a "prototype of usage" (2013, 147). Conversely, an 'exploitation' is a 'noncentral' use: "Normal usage can be identified by evidence

of repeated use, while exploitations can be identified because they show some abnormality, aberration, eccentricity or other departure from the norm" (2013, 147), which according to Hanks also includes metaphors and puns (see Teubert 2016 for some discussion). Again, no reference whatsoever is made to the already established tradition of normal language use research initiated by Hjelmslev in Structural Linguistics. Relevant work of Hjelmslev, Coseriu, Bartsch, Koch and Oesterreicher, and many other authors, is not mentioned in Hanks' book and no theoretical basis for determining the status of conventionalised norms *vis-à-vis* systematic language-specific structures and individual instances of language use is offered.

6. Structuralist notion no. 4: The role of paradigmatic contrasts

As already highlighted in Section 2, the notion of paradigmatic contrast is central to the accounts of language proposed by Saussure and structuralist scholars such as Hjelmslev, who introduced the term 'paradigmatic relation' with regard to one of Saussure's 'associative relations' (cf. Saussure 1967–1968, 276–289 and Hjelmslev 1943a [1961], §11). In some of the contemporary structural-functional schools of thought the notion of paradigmatic contrast has remained pivotal. Both Integral Linguistics and Systemic Functional Linguistics rely for their theories of meaning on Saussure's theory of the linguistic sign and Hjelmslev's subsequent elaboration of this theory (cf. Saussure 1967–1968, 2011, Hjelmslev 1943a [1961], 1963 [1970]). Structurally encoded meanings are conceived of, in both frameworks, in terms of relations of contrast (*oppositions*) that hold between linguistic signs, giving rise to what in Saussure's theory of meaning is called *valeur*. Meaning contrasts can be defined both from a paradigmatic and a syntagmatic point of view.

The primary focus in Integral Linguistics is on meaning contrasts from a paradigmatic point of view (see Coseriu 1979, 1987, 1992, 2001, 2007 for extensive discussions). Central to Integral Linguistics is the assumption that any structurally encoded meaning has to be defined in relation to the structurally encoded meanings of other elements in the same linguistic system with which it con-

trasts paradigmatically. Taken together, the contrasting elements constitute language-specific paradigms, both in the lexicon and in the grammar. It is a word's or construction's *valeur* that delimits its encoded meaning in the language system, the signified (*signifié*, Saussure 1967–1968, 252–257). A structurally encoded meaning is emphatically not considered a mental 'representation' of an extra-linguistic object or state of affairs, not even of an abstract kind. Given that the *valeur* of a linguistic sign is that which is not the *valeurs* of related signs, paradigmatic relations jointly delimit any one sign's semantic 'intension' in the system. For instance, according to Coseriu (1978, 195), the structurally encoded meaning of the French verb *venir* ('to come') has to be established in contrast with related French verbs such as *marcher* ('to walk'), *aller* ('to go'), *partir* ('to leave), *sortir* ('to go out'), *entrer* ('to enter') etc., which together form a paradigm of verbs of movement in the standard variety of French. Similarly, when one aims to determine the signified of the noun *stair* in English, the paradigmatic contrast with *ladder* must be taken into account. The language-specific nature of these nouns and their signifieds becomes clear when the English word pair *stair–ladder* is compared with, e.g., Italian. In contrast to English, Italian *scala* does not discriminate between 'stair' and 'ladder' in terms of a paradigmatic contrast (Coseriu 1978, 209).

In Systemic Functional Linguistics the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic point of view are considered equally important. They are referred to as 'system' and 'structure', respectively (Martin 1992). Initially, the focus was on meaning contrasts from a syntagmatic point of view, in line with Firth's famous principle that "you shall know a word by the company it keeps" (Firth 1957, 11; cf. Halliday 1973, 1995, Hanks 2013), but the paradigmatic point of view became increasingly important in later stages of the theory (cf. Martin 1992, Taverniers 2011). Whereas in Integral Linguistics the focus has been on the paradigmatically determined encoded meanings of both lexical items and grammatical structures (see Coseriu 1987, 133–176 and 1989 for an outline of an Integral Linguistics approach to syntax), Systemic Functional Linguistics has not so much focused on developing a comparable theory of lexical semantics but instead put emphasis on the encoded functions of phrases, clauses and clause

complexes in a system network of interlocking options (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, 2014, Martin 1992).

The notion of paradigmatic contrast also pops up among contemporary linguistic approaches that do not expressly invoke structuralist assumptions. In what follows, we confine ourselves to two cases in point that are particularly worthwhile, viz. the use of contrasts with regard to some of the maxims relied upon in Neo-Gricean Pragmatics (Levinson 2000) and the role contrasts play in one of the most influential theories of information structure in the cognitive-functional tradition, viz. Lambrecht's (1987, 1994, 2000) theory of focus types.

As already pointed out in Section 5, in the context of Neo-Gricean Pragmatics various maxims have been proposed to explain how language users construe conversational implicatures, starting from the grammatically encoded meaning of words, phrases and sentences. Many of these maxims draw on the knowledge of language users not only about what is being said, but also about what is not being said. For Levinson (2000), the notion of 'contrast' is pivotal in explaining how maxims work. Instantiations of Grice's maxims of quantity and manner establish salient contrasts by virtue of which different kinds of implicit meaning are conveyed. The maxim of quantity is defined in terms of the heuristics "What isn't said, isn't" and "What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified (i.e., is as usual)", the maxim of manner in terms of the heuristic "What is said in an abnormal way, isn't normal, or: marked message indicates marked situation" (Levinson 2000, 33–34). For example, an utterance such as *Some of the boys came* conveys on the basis of the scalar contrast set <*all, some*> that "not all of the boys came", if only implicitly. The rationale behind this way of communicating what is actually meant is "that the speaker would have chosen the stronger alternate if he was in a position to do so" (2000, 36). Similarly, *Not all of the boys came* is usually understood to express that "some of the boys did come" by virtue of the negative scales contrast <*none, not all*> (2000, 36).

Thus, for Neo-Gricean pragmatics of this ilk, contrast and what is not said both play a crucial role in the knowledge language users put to use in ordinary discourse, and it is contrasts of the aforementioned kind that license a certain interpretation rather than

another. Interestingly, the contrasts referred to are situated on the level of Generalised Conversational Implicatures and, hence, normal language use, rather than on the level of structurally encoded semantics. The family resemblance with the semantic feature analysis put forward by Katz and Fodor (1963) is obvious (cf. Section 4). In that account, too, traits are established in view of interpretations of utterances regardless of whether they are encoded features of signifieds or encyclopaedic features associated with extralinguistic referents and contexts. This is an important difference with the work on paradigmatic contrasts in a framework such as Integral Linguistics. In this framework, contrasts are instrumental in delimiting and structuring paradigms (lexical fields), which pertain to the structurally encoded semantics of a particular language (see Belligh and Willems 2021 for discussion).

Considerations such as those put forward by Levinson also draw on the originally structuralist theory of markedness. This theory has been developed in great detail by authors such as Trubetzkoy (1939 [1958], 66–75), Jakobson (1939 [1971] and Hjelmslev (1939 [1971]), but the notion of 'markedness' has become so ingrained in modern linguistics that it is taken for granted and no longer recognised as an originally structuralist notion (cf. Battistella 1990, 1996 and De Backer 2009 for discussions).

A second case in point is the theory of information structure developed by Knud Lambrecht (1939–2019) (1987, 1994, 2000). Lambrecht's theory of information structure has been very influential in contemporary functionally oriented linguistics and has become the dominant theory of information structure in both Construction Grammar and Role and Reference Grammar (see Leino 2013 for discussion). Lambrecht is a disciple of Charles Fillmore (1929–2014) and Wallace Chafe (1927–2019), his work is rooted in the American Construction Grammar framework (Fillmore 1988, Fillmore and Atkins 1992, Fillmore and Kay 1993; cf. Goldberg 1995, 2006). This framework can be situated within the broader paradigm of Cognitive Linguistics and positions itself unambiguously in contrast to Generative Grammar and, albeit more obliquely, Structural Linguistics. Lambrecht nevertheless regularly invokes the notion of paradigmatic contrasts to develop his theory of information struc-

ture. In doing so, Lambrecht goes considerably further than, for example, Levinson (2000) in openly subscribing to 'paradigmatic contrasts' in a manner that is reminiscent of a hallmark structuralist assumption:

> This [...] requires a 'structuralist' rather than 'generativist approach', i.e. an approach in which the interpretation of a given structure is viewed as being determined within a system of formal oppositions rather than by a set of rules. (Lambrecht 1994, 322)
>
> In seeking to explain the form-function fit in focus constructions in terms of the structuralist notion of paradigmatic opposition the analysis challenges both functional and formal generative approaches to grammar. (Lambrecht 2000, 611)

Lambrecht relies on the notion of paradigmatic contrast to differentiate between three types of formally distinguishable focus constructions, each with its own typical focus construal, viz. predicate-focus construal, argument-focus construal and sentence-focus construal (Lambrecht 1994, 221–238). Predicate-focus construal entails that the scope of the focus operator is limited to the predicate, with the subject falling within the scope of the presupposition, as in (5). Alternatively, the scope of the focus operator can be limited to an argument constituent only, with the predicate constituent falling within the scope of the presupposition, which is labeled argument-focus construal, e.g. (6). Finally, it is also possible that both the subject and the predicate fall under the scope of the focus operator, which is then said to be an instance of sentence-focus construal, e.g. (7).

(5) (What did John do?) *John went to the LIBRARY*.[92]

(6) (Who went to the library?) *JOHN went to the library*.

(7) (What happened?) *JOHN went to the library*.

---

92. Capital letters indicate prosodic prominence on certain constituents, which is mostly realised by a peak in pitch.

In contrast to previous information-structural approaches to focus structure, which mostly focused on the focal or non-focal status of individual constituents rather than on the sentential pattern as a whole, Lambrecht's innovative contribution was to look at the realisations of focus configurations as sentential constructions that are determined paradigmatically in relation to other focus-related sentential constructions. By adopting such a perspective, it becomes understandable why in sentence-focus constructions such as (7) only the subject is highlighted prosodically, rather than both the subject and the predicate, which would be expected if the focused or non-focused status of every phrasal constituent taken by itself would be reflected in linguistic form. In Lambrecht's (1987, 1994, 2000) view, sentence-focus constructions have the form they do because their form makes it possible to create a paradigmatic contrast with the form of predicate-focus constructions, which according to Lambrecht are unmarked constructions. The difference with regard to form, e.g. accentuation of the subject or the predicate, corresponds on the functional level to the difference between sentence-focus construal and predicate-focus construal.

While Lambrecht countenances the idea that paradigmatic contrasts have an important role to play in contemporary functionalist linguistics, a number of critical remarks can be made pertaining to how true to the structuralist notion of paradigmatic contrast his theory actually is (cf. Belligh 2020a, 2020b, Belligh and Crocco 2022 for a fuller discussion). In structuralist accounts of paradigmatic relations, the 'one-to-one relationship' between a form and a unitary meaning is of paramount importance, yet Lambrecht's application of the notion of paradigmatic contrast differs in a number of respects. While on a functional level the three types of focus construal are all defined in terms of paradigmatic oppositions, it is not possible to establish the same opposition on the level of the forms of the constructions. According to Lambrecht (1994, 2000), argument-focus constructions and sentence-focus constructions are often homonymous, which is already evident from the above examples (6) and (7). With respect to the form of the constructions, the principle of paradigmatic contrast only plays out convincingly with regard to the distinction between predicate-focus constructions, on

the one hand, and argument-focus constructions and sentence-focus constructions, on the other. Lambrecht (1987, 1994, 2000) motivates this by maintaining that both argument-focus and sentence-focus constructions are marked deviations from predicate-focus constructions, which Lambrecht considers unmarked constructions *par excellence*. Furthermore, Lambrecht (1994) concedes that predicate-focus constructions can often be used to convey argument-focus construal and sentence-focus construal as well. This further deviation from the expected one-to-one relationship between form and meaning is explained by Lambrecht as a result of the 'neutral position' of predicate-focus constructions as unmarked constructions.

While Lambrecht's system, as presented by the author himself, already takes into account various deviations from the one-to-one relationship between form and meaning, there are at least some cases where he excludes additional deviations. In particular, Lambrecht (1987, 1994, 2000) claims that full-fledged, i.e. formally marked, sentence-focus constructions cannot be used for the expression of predicate-focus construal. However, some sentence-focus constructions in both Dutch and Italian do allow for predicate-focus construal (see Belligh 2020a, 2020b, Belligh and Crocco 2022). Due to the very limited one-to-one correspondences between functions and grammatical forms, it has been argued that Lambrecht's typology of three focus categories might better be reinterpreted as a typology of categories of normal language use, rather than as categories that characterise the grammar of particular language systems (cf. Section 5). This view entails that in several languages various sentential constructions can be used to convey predicate-focus, argument-focus and sentence-focus construal, but that none of these categories corresponds to a structurally encoded signified of any one construction involved (Belligh 2020a, 2020b, Belligh and Crocco 2022). The paradigmatic contrast proposed by Lambrecht thus ends up being a contrast on the level of normal language use rather than a paradigmatic contrast in the grammar of language systems.

7. Structuralist notion no. 5: Language is an intersubjectively shared system rather than a cognitive module

Among the key insights Saussure and the structuralist scholars directly inspired by him brought to linguistics is the idea that language (*langue*), in addition to being a mental phenomenon, is also fundamentally a social phenomenon.[93] Although there has been much controversy about the extent to which Saussure (1967–1968, 158–174) defined his concept of *langue* along the lines of Durkheim's (1895) notion of 'social fact' (see Bierbach 1978, Koerner 1989, Ch. 3, among others), there are several indications that Saussure conceptualised language first and foremost in sociological terms.[94]

First of all, it is generally acknowledged that Saussure "tended increasingly towards sociological rather than psychological formulations of *langue*" (Joseph 1995, 224). *Langue* as an abstract socially shared system is therefore beyond the direct reach of the individual will (see Thibault 1997, Linda 2001 and Joseph this volume for extensive discussions). Secondly, the structuralist schools that emerged after the publication of the *Cours* shared "a preference for social abstraction over mental ones, including an axiomatic faith in language as a fundamentally social phenomenon" (Joseph 1995, 225). The structuralist notion of language as a social phenomenon is indebted to Saussure's view that language is not only a tool for cognition (cf. Saussure 1967–1968, 251–264) but also a tool for communication, and that communication is inherently social (Saussure 1967–1968, 37–52, 172–174). At the same time, Saussure maintained that a *langue* is deposited in an identical form in the mind of every language user of a particular language (Joseph 1995, 235), thereby

93. Saussure and the structuralist scholars inspired by him were not the first to consider language to be a social phenomenon, but historically they brought the social nature of language to centre stage after previous paradigms in linguistics inclined to characterise language primarily in biological or strictly psychological terms (Joseph 1995, 234–235 and Joseph this volume).

94. Saussure's sociological view is also indebted to the work of other French sociologists, e.g. the work of Gabriel de Tarde (cf. Joseph 2012, 508).

stressing that *langue* is a mental phenomenon as well. This double nature attributed to *langue* by Saussure led to considerable debate in the many theories that followed in the second half of the twentieth century (cf. Itkonen 1978, 55–90). Although language is inherently intersubjective and social but at the same time exists in the individual minds of human agents, it seems that most linguistic schools of thought tend to focus on one of these two aspects at the expense of the other.

The understanding that language is at the same time a social and a mental phenomenon is endorsed by two of the contemporary structural-functional approaches we already discussed in previous sections, viz. Integral Linguistics and Systemic Functional Linguistics, albeit with differences in emphasis and focus. In Systemic Functional Linguistics, the mental dimension is readily acknowledged, but the main focus is on language as a social phenomenon. In contrast to many other contemporary functionalist theories of language, Systemic Functional Linguistics does not attempt to frame its analyses in terms of a mental or psychological theory of language (Butler 2003), in accordance with the basic assumption that

> linguistics is a branch of sociology. Language is a part of the social system, and there is no need to interpose a psychological level of interpretation. (Halliday 1978, 39).

In Integral Linguistics (cf. Coseriu 1958 [1974], 1962 [1975], 2007), emphasis is placed on the intersubjective nature of language, which arguably resolves a possible conflict between the social and the mental. While Coseriu claims that language is intrinsically tied to human consciousness, the intuitive conscious knowledge every speaker possesses of language is said to be shared by the members of a linguistic community. This knowledge is therefore also of an inherently social nature. However, there is a risk that a social fact such as language is mistakenly defined as a phenomenon that exists above and beyond all individual speakers/hearers 'taken together', whereas it is a phenomenon that only exists above and beyond individual speakers/hearers when they are 'taken separately'. The conception of language as independent from all individual speak-

ers/hearers 'taken together' is based on a fallacious, sorites-like argument (Coseriu 1958 [1974], 28). If language is understood as an intersubjective system that occupies a level 'above' the language users only when they are considered as separate individuals, no conflict arises between the social and the mental. For Integral Linguistics, a language exists in reality only inasmuch as individual language users realise – or better still: continuously create and re-create – language in the activity of speaking (or writing, or in whatever modality). There is mutual interdependence: intersubjectively shared 'systems' and 'norms' of languages are individuated in acts of discourse, but then again these systems and norms exist only insofar as they are manifested in individuals' creative acts of language use.

With the advent of Generative Grammar, language was drastically reconceptualised as a purely mental – or even 'material' – phenomenon, with little or no room for its social or intersubjective nature. The scientific study of language was rebranded by Chomsky as constituting an integral part of cognitive psychology and the study of language was primarily seen as a possible way to probe into the unconscious structures of the mind (cf. Chomsky 1972 [2006]). The 'cognitive turn' in linguistics initiated by Chomsky abruptly broke with some of the basic insights of Saussure and many structuralist linguists. This way of approaching language in mental terms has dominated American linguistics since the 1960s and continues to exert a profound influence in contemporary linguistic research. This is also evident if one considers some of the core tenets of the broad paradigm of Cognitive Linguistics (cf. Langacker 1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1999, 2007, Taylor 1999, 2002, 2003, 2012, Geeraerts and Cuyckens, eds. 2007). Cognitive Linguistics is radically opposed to many core assumptions of Generative Grammar, including its restrictivist focus on formal aspects of language, in particular syntax and phonology, and its basic assumptions regarding the modularity of the human mind (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, eds. 2007, Taylor 2007). Most cognitive linguists have nonetheless adopted the view of generative grammarians that the individual mind is the ontological locus of language. Furthermore, both generative grammarians and cognitive linguists approach language and the human mind in

terms of unconscious knowledge structures and subpersonal computational modules, which can ultimately be considered functions of physical brain states (cf. Itkonen 2008, Zlatev 2008, Belligh 2021 for discussion).

The attempt to conceive language in mental-material and non-social terms in Generative Grammar and Cognitive Linguistics has been criticised over the past 50 years by a number of scholars, in particular Esa Itkonen (1944-) (1978, 1983, 1997, 2008). Itkonen has argued that such a conception cannot adequately capture crucial aspects of natural language, including what Itkonen calls its 'normativity'. Itkonen's notion of 'normativity' should not be confused with the use of the term 'norm' to designate the role 'normal language use' plays as an intermediary level between language systems and individual acts of discourse (cf. Section 5). 'Normativity', in Itkonen's understanding, refers to the fact that the conventions typical of language must be conceived in terms of 'what ought to be said' rather than 'what is said' (Itkonen 1997, 53). 'Normativity' in this sense applies to the language system and normal language use alike. The presence of normativity in languages means that language is not only characterised by various types of 'regularities', but also by prescriptive 'rules'. Based on arguments drawn from the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper, Itkonen maintains that prescriptive rules cannot exist in a purely mental or material world but only by virtue of intersubjectively shared normative knowledge. According to Itkonen, neither Generative Grammar nor mainstream Cognitive Linguistics adequately capture this indispensable social dimension in their accounts of language. Because both frameworks at the same time rely on normative judgments regarding correctness and acceptability for their empirical analyses, their "methodological self-understanding suffers from serious defects" (Itkonen 1997, 49).

Itkonen's criticism has so far largely been ignored in Generative Grammar. Within Cognitive Linguistics, it has inspired a number of scholars to reintroduce notions such as 'socially shared conventions', 'normativity' and 'intersubjectivity' in the context of cognitive-linguistic research, in line with previous structuralist thinking. For instance, Zlatev (2007, 2008) explicitly draws on Itkonen (1978,

1983, 1997) to partly adjust the ontological commitments of Cognitive Linguistics. While giving pride of place to consciousness in the study of the human mind, rather than unconscious structures and subpersonal mechanisms, Zlatev (2007, 2008) also connects this shift in perspective with a renewed focus on the intersubjectivity of language so as to avoid the 'serious defects' in the self-understanding of Cognitive Linguistics. This innovation could also align Cognitive Linguistics with some of the basic tenets of Integral Linguistics (cf. Belligh 2021). More generally speaking, the last few years there has been an increased interest in social phenomena in the work of several other cognitive linguists as well (cf. Schmid 2016, Geeraerts 2017, among others). This turn in approach has primarily been informed by sociolinguistic research on linguistic variation.

Recent developments such as these give credence to the conclusion that the basic Saussurean and structuralist characterisation of language as a social and intersubjective phenomenon has found its way back to contemporary linguistics also among theoretical frameworks which do not explicitly acknowledge any intellectual indebtedness to the structuralist tradition. Whether this trend will be sustained in Cognitive Linguistics and perhaps even prove capable of orienting future research in Generative Grammar (cf. Newmeyer 1998), is as yet an open question.

8. Conclusion

In this article, we addressed the legacy of structuralism in contemporary linguistics with a focus on the presence of theoretical concepts and distinctions as well as empirical analyses reminiscent of structuralism both in approaches that expressly continue the structuralist tradition and those that consider themselves to profoundly differ from Structural Linguistics. We started off with an overview of the main assumptions that characterise Structural Linguistics and briefly surveyed a number of structural-functional, functionalist, cognitive and pragmatic schools of thought that are particularly relevant with regard to our research question (Section 2). The main thrust of the article was a discussion of five specific

notions which played an important role in Structural Linguistics and continue to live on in current linguistics. The five specific notions we discussed are the view that each language should be described in its own terms (Section 3), the claim that a distinction must be made between language-specific encoded meaning and non-language-specific meaning, viz. contextually and encyclopaedically enriched utterance meaning (Section 4), the view that in between the grammar of a language system and individual acts of discourse an intermediary level of 'normal language use' must be taken into account (Section 5), the claim that paradigmatic contrasts are of paramount importance to arrive at a coherent understanding of language systems (Section 6), and the conviction that language systems and grammars are of an inherently social and intersubjective nature (Section 7). We adduced evidence to show that these five structuralist notions continue to guide contemporary linguistic research, albeit often with important qualifications.

To conclude the article, we briefly dwell on the question what kind of attitude, or mindset, towards structuralist notions might be beneficial for linguistic scholarship. Linguists' appraisals of previous scholarship frequently reflect a troubled relationship with the history of the discipline in a strangely recurrent way. For instance, while Chomsky criticises Saussure (and Whitney) for having had an "impoverished and thoroughly inadequate conception of language" (Chomsky 1972 [2006], 18; cf. Joseph 2002 for discussion), many authors subsequently criticised Chomsky for largely the same reason and, incidentally, often in one breath with Saussure (e.g. Agha 2007). Thus it would appear that obsolescence is not so much a quality of the past but an assessment of the present – yet the present is nothing but a temporary stop, it continually recedes into the past. To us it seems that this conundrum can be resolved if a historiographically informed perspective on the history of linguistics is combined with a philosophical attitude that Hegel describes as *Aufheben* ('sublation') (cf. Coseriu 1992 [2000]).

A historiographically informed perspective demands that appraisals of previous scholarship are based on a reasonably comprehensive knowledge of scholars' work and not on an overly selective or biased reading. It is, for example, noteworthy that neither

Chomsky (1972 [2006]), nor Agha (2007) discuss Saussure's theory of the bilateral sign and his historically foundational understanding of language-specific signifieds, but at the same time dismiss Saussure's contribution to modern linguistics on grounds that cannot be addressed without taking his theory of the bilateral sign into account. Selective or biased readings of previous scholarship which result in decontextualising those parts of the history of linguistics that are not recoverable due to a specific focus might not be the best strategy to move forward. This is where Hegel's notion of *Aufheben* ('sublation') turns out to be helpful. *Aufheben* means that what is being surpassed in the history of thought should at the same time be integrated and preserved:

> *To sublate* and *being sublated* (the *idealized*) constitute one of the most important concepts of philosophy. It is a fundamental determination that repeatedly occurs everywhere in it, the meaning of which must be grasped with precision and especially distinguished from *nothing*. – What is sublated does not thereby turn into nothing. Nothing is the *immediate*; something sublated is on the contrary something *mediated*; it is something non-existent but as a result that has proceeded from a being; it still *has in itself*, therefore, the *determinateness from which it derives*.
>
> The German *aufheben* ('to sublate' in English) has a twofold meaning in the language: it equally means '*to keep*,' 'to preserve,' and 'to cause to cease,' '*to put an end to*.' Even 'to preserve' already includes a negative note, namely that something, in order to be retained, is removed from its immediacy and hence from an existence which is open to external influences. – That which is sublated is thus something at the same time preserved, something that has lost its immediacy but has not come to nothing for that. (Hegel 1832 [2010], 81–82)

If successful, the risk that structuralism is a siren whose song lures unsuspecting linguists into favouring obsolete ideas and assumptions could at least be substantially reduced.

Bibliography

Agha, Asif (2007), “The object called ‘language’ and the subject of linguistics”, *Journal of English Linguistics*, 35 (3), 217–235.

Albrecht, Jörn (2007), *Europäischer Strukturalismus. Ein forschungsgeschichtlicher Überblick* (third edition), Tübingen, Narr.

Albrecht, Jörn, Lüdtke, Jens & Thun, Harald (eds., 1988), *Energeia und Ergon. Sprachliche Variation – Sprachgeschichte – Sprachtypologie. Studia in honorem Eugenio Coseriu*, Tübingen, Narr.

Atlas, David (1989), *Philosophy without ambiguity*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

– (2005), *Logic, meaning, and conversation. Semantical underdeterminancy, implicature, and their interface*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Bach, Kent (1994), “Conversational impliciture”, *Mind and Language*, 9 (2), 124–162.

– (2010), “Impliciture vs. explicature: what’s the difference?”, in: Soria, Belén & Romero, Esther (eds.), *Explicit communication: Robyn Carston’s pragmatics*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 126–137.

Bartsch, Renate (1985), *Sprachnormen: Theorie und Praxis*, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer.

– (1987), *Norms of language. Theoretical and practical aspects*, London & New York: Longman.

Battistella, Edwin (1990), *Markedness. The evaluative superstructure of language*, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press.

– (1996), *The logic of markedness*. New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Belligh, Thomas (2020a), “Dutch thetic and sentence-focus constructions on the semantics-pragmatics interface: a case study”, *Studies in Language*, 44 (4), 831–878.

– (2020b), “Are theticity and sentence-focus encoded grammatical categories of Dutch?”, in: Abraham, Werner, Leiss, Elisabeth & Fujinawa, Yasuhiro (eds.), *Thetics and categoricals*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 33–68.

– (2021), “Language as activity, linguistic knowledge and cognitive psychology: a Coserian perspective”, in: Willems, Klaas & Munteanu, Cristinel (eds.), *Eugenio Coseriu: Past, Present and Future*, Berlin and New York, De Gruyter, 327–344.

Belligh, Thomas & Willems, Klaas (2021), “What’s in a code? The code-inference distinction in Neo-Gricean Pragmatics, Relevance Theory, and Integral Linguistics”, *Language Sciences*, 83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2020.101310

Belligh, Thomas & Crocco, Claudia (2022), “Theticity and sentence-focus in Italian: grammatically encoded categories or categories of language use?”, *Linguistics*. doi.org/10.1515/ling-2020–0141

Bierbach, Christine (1978), *Sprache als ‘fait social’. Die linguistische Theorie F. de Saussures und ihr Verhältnis zu den positivistischen Sozialwissenschaften*, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer.

Blank, Andreas (1997), *Prinzipien des lexikalischen Bedeutungswandels am Beispiel der romanischen Sprachen*, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer.

Bloomfield, Leonard (1933), *Language*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Boas, Franz (1911), “Introduction”, in: Boas, Franz (ed.), *Handbook of American Indian languages* (*Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin* 40, Part 1), Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 5–83.

Bühler, Karl (1934), *Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache*, Jena, Gustav Fischer. (Reprints Stuttgart, UTB 1982, 1999.)

– (1934) [1990], *The theory of language: the representational function of language*. Translated by Donald Fraser Goodwin, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins.

Butler, Christopher (2003), *Structure and function. A guide to three major structural-functional theories*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins.

Cappelle, Bert (2006), “Particle placement and the case for ‘allostructions’”, *Constructions Online*, SV-1 (7), 1–28.

Carston, Robyn (2002), *Thoughts and utterances. The pragmatics of explicit communication,* Malden, Blackwell.

Carston, Robyn & Hall, Alison (2012), “Implicature and explicature”, in: Hans-Jörg Schmid (ed.), *Cognitive Pragmatics*, Berlin, De Gruyter, 47–84.

Chomsky, Noam (1972) [2006]. *Language and mind* (third edition; first edition 1968; second, expanded edition 1972), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Coene, Ann & Willems, Klaas (2006), “Konstruktionelle Bedeutungen. Kritische Anmerkungen zu Adele Goldbergs konstruktionsgrammatischer Bedeutungstheorie”, *Sprachtheorie und germanistische Linguistik*, 16, 1–35.

Coseriu, Eugenio (1952) [1975], “System, Norm und Rede”, in: Eugenio Coseriu, *Sprachtheorie und allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft. 5 Studien*, München, Fink, 11–101.

– (1955) [1975], *Die Sprachgeographie*, Tübingen, Narr.

– (1958) [1974], *Synchronie, Diachronie und Geschichte. Das Problem des Sprachwandels,* München, Fink.

– (1962) [1975], *Sprachtheorie und allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft. 5 Studien*, München, Fink.

– (1970), "Bedeutung und Bezeichnung im Lichte der strukturellen Semantik", in: Hartmann, Peter & Vernay, Henry (eds.), *Sprachwissenschaft und Übersetzen*, München, Hueber, 104–121.
– (1974) [1977], "Linguistic (and other) universals", in: Makkai, Adam, Makkai, Valerie Becker & Heilmann, Luigi (eds.), *Linguistics at the crossroads*, Padua & Lake Bluff, Ill., Liviana & Jupiter Press, 317–346.
– (1978), "Einführung in die strukturelle Betrachtung des Wortschatzes", in: Geckeler, Horst (ed.), *Strukturelle Bedeutungslehre*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 193–238.
– (1979), *Sprache: Strukturen und Funktionen* (third edition), Tübingen, Narr.
– (1983), "Linguistic change does not exist", *Linguistica nuova ed antica. Rivista di linguistica classica medioevale e moderna*, 1, 51–63.
– (1985), "Linguistic competence: what is it really? The Presidential Address of the Modern Humanities Research Association", *The Modern Language Review*, 80 (4), xxv–xxxv.
– (1987), *Formen und Funktionen. Studien zur Grammatik*, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer.
– (1989), "Principes de syntaxe fonctionnelle", *Travaux de linguistique et de philologie*, 27, 5–46.
– (1990) [2000], "Structural semantics and 'cognitive' semantics", *Logos and Language*, 1 (1), 19–42.
– (1992), *Einführung in die Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft* (second edition), Tübingen, Francke.
– (2000), "The principles of linguistics as a cultural science", *Transylvanian Review*, 9 (1), 108–115.
– (2001), *L'homme et son langage*. Edited by Hiltraud Dupuy-Engelhardt, Jean-Pierre Durafour & François Rastier, Louvain, Peeters.
– (2007), *Sprachkompetenz. Grundzüge der Theorie des Sprechens* (second edition), Tübingen, Narr.
– (2015), *Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie*, Vol. 1: *Von Heraklit bis Rousseau*, Vol. 2: *Von Herder bis Humboldt*. Edited by Jörn Albrecht, Tübingen, Narr & Francke, Attempto.

Coseriu, Eugenio & Geckeler, Horst (1974), "Linguistics and semantics", in: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), *Current trends in linguistics*, Vol. 12, The Hague & Paris, Mouton, 103–171.

De Backer, Maarten (2009), "The concept of neutralization outside the field of phonology", *Indogermanische Forschungen*, 114 (1), 1–59.

De Cuypere, Ludovic (2013), "Debiasing semantic analysis: the English preposition *to*", *Language Sciences*, 37, 122–135.

De Hoop, Helen & Narasimhan, Bhuvana (2008), "Ergative case marking in Hindi", in: De Hoop, Helen & De Swart, Peter (eds.), *Differential subject marking*, Dordrecht, Springer, 63–78.

De Vaere, Hilde, De Cuypere, Ludovic & Willems, Klaas (2018), "Alternating constructions with ditransitive *geben* in present-day German. *Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic Theory*. https://doi.org/10.1515/cllt-2017–0072

De Vaere, Hilde, Kolkmann, Julia & Belligh, Thomas (2020), "Allostructions revisited", *Journal of Pragmatics*, 170, 96–111.

De Vaere, Hilde, De Cuypere, Ludovic & Willems, Klaas (2021), "Constructional variation with two near-synonymous verbs: the case of *schicken* and *senden* in present-day German", *Language Sciences*, 83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2020.101313

Dietrich, Wolf (1997), "Polysemie als 'volle Wortbedeutung' – gegen die Mehrdeutigkeit der Zeichen", in: Hoinkes, Ulrich & Dietrich, Wolf (eds.), *Kaleidoskop der lexikalischen Semantik*, Tübingen, Narr, 227–237.

– (2021), "Coseriu's approach to word formation as an illustration of his theory of meaning", in: Willems, Klaas & Munteanu, Cristinel (eds.), *Eugenio Coseriu: Past, Present and Future*, Berlin & New York, De Gruyter, 279–293.

Diver, William (1995), "Theory", in: Contini-Morava, Ellen & Goldberg, Barbara (eds.), *Meaning as Explanation: Advances in Linguistic Sign Theory*, Berlin & New York, Mouton de Gruyter, 43–114.

Dryer, Matthew (1997), "Are grammatical relations universal?", in: Bybee, Joan, Haiman, John & Thompson, Sandra (eds.), *Essays on language function and language type*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 115–143.

Durkheim, Émile (1895), *Les règles de la méthode sociologique,* Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan.

Evans, Nicholas & Levinson, Stephen (2009), "The myth of language universals: language diversity and its importance for Cognitive Science", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 32 (5), 429–448.

Evans, Vyvan (2009), *How words mean. Lexical concepts, cognitive models and meaning construction*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

– (2015), "A unified account of polysemy within LCCM theory", *Lingua*, 157, 100–123.

Féry, Caroline & Krifka, Manfred (2008), "Information structure. Notional distinctions, ways of expression", in: van Sterkenburg, Piet (ed.), *Unity and diversity of languages*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 123–136.

FILLMORE, CHARLES (1968), "The case for case", in: Bach, Emmon & Harms, Robert T. (eds.), *Universals in linguistic theory*, New York, Rinehart & Winston, 1–88.

– (1982), "Towards a descriptive framework for spatial deixis", in: Jarvella, Robert J. & Klein, Wolfgang (eds.), *Speech, place, and action. Studies in deixis and related topics*, Chichester, Wiley, 31–59.

– (1985), "Frames and the semantics of understanding", *Quaderni di semantica*, 6, 222–254.

– (1988), "The mechanisms of 'Construction Grammar'", in: Axmaker, Shelley, Jaisser, Annie & Singmaster, Helen (eds.), *Proceedings of the fourteenth annual meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*, Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Linguistics Society, 35–55.

FILLMORE, CHARLES, KAY, PAUL & O'CONNOR, MARY CATHERINE (1988), "Regularity and idiomaticity in grammatical constructions: The case of let alone", *Language*, 64 (3), 501–538.

FILLMORE, CHARLES & ATKINS, BERYL (1992), "Toward a frame-based lexicon: the semantics of RISK and its neighbors", in: Lehrer, Adrienne & Kittay, Eva Feder (eds.), *Frames, fields, and contrasts: New essays in semantic and lexical organization*, Hillsdale, Erlbaum, 75–102.

FILLMORE, CHARLES & KAY, PAUL (1993), *Construction Grammar coursebook*, Berkeley, University of California, Berkeley.

FIRTH, JOHN (1957), *Papers in linguistics 1934–1951*, London, Oxford University Press.

FOUGHT, JOHN (1995), "American structuralism", in: Koerner, E.F.K. & Asher, R.E. (eds.), *Concise history of the language sciences: from the Sumerians to the Cognitivists*, Oxford, Pergamon, 295–306.

FRISSON, STEVEN (2009), "Semantic underspecification in language processing", *Language and Linguistics Compass*, 3 (1), 111–127.

– (2015), "About bound and scary books: The processing of *book* polysemies", *Lingua*, 157, 17–35.

FUDGE, ERIK (1995), "The glossematic school of linguistics", in: Koerner, E.F.K. & Asher, R.E. (eds.), *Concise history of the language sciences: from the Sumerians to the Cognitivists*, Oxford, Pergamon, 262–268.

GECKELER, HORST (1971), *Zur Wortfelddiskussion*, München, Fink.

GEERAERTS, DIRK (1997), *Diachronic prototype semantics. A contribution to historical lexicology*, Oxford, Clarendon.

– (2010), *Theories of lexical semantics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

– (2015), "Sense individuation", in: Riemer, Nick (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of semantics*, London, Routledge, 233–247.

– (2017), *Ten lectures on Cognitive Sociolinguistics*, Beijing, Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press.

Geeraerts, Dirk & Cuyckens, Hubert (2007), "Introducing Cognitive Linguistics", in: Geeraerts, Dirk & Cuyckens, Hubert (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 3–21.

Givón, Talmy (2016), "Beyond structuralismnExorcizing Saussure's ghost", *Studies in Language*, 40 (3), 681–704.

Goldberg, Adele (1995), *Constructions. A Construction Grammar approach to argument structure*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

– (2006), *Constructions at work. The nature of generalization in language*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Gordon, W. Terrence (1992), Review of Brigitte Nerlich (1992), *Semantic Theories in Europe, 1830–1930*. *Historiographia Linguistica*, 19 (2/3), 387–392.

Grice, H. Paul (1989), *Studies in the way of words,* Cambridge, MA & London, Harvard University Press.

Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood (1973), *Explorations in the functions of language*, London, Edward Arnold.

– (1978), *Language as a social semiotic. The social interpretation of language and meaning*, London, Edward Arnold.

– (1995), "Systemic theory", in: Koerner, E.F.K. & Asher, R.E. (eds.), *Concise history of the language sciences: from the Sumerians to the Cognitivists*, Oxford, Pergamon, 272–276.

Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood & Matthiessen, Christian (2004), *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

– (2014), *Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar,* New York, Routledge.

Hanks, Patrick (2013), *Lexical analysis: norms and exploitations*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

Haspelmath, Martin (2003), "The geometry of grammatical meaning: Semantic maps and cross-linguistic comparison", in: Tomasello, Michael (ed.), *The new psychology of language. Cognitive and functional approaches to language structure*, Vol. II, Mahwah, NJ & London, Lawrence Erlbaum, 211–242.

– (2007), "Pre-established categories don't exist: consequences for language description and typology", *Linguistic Typology*, 11 (1), 119–132.

– (2010), "Comparative concepts and descriptive categories in cross-linguistic studies", *Language*, 86 (3), 663–687.

Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm (2010) [1832]. *The science of logic*. Translated by George Di Giovanni, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Hjelmslev, Louis (1928), *Principes de grammaire générale*, Copenhagen, Bianco Lunos.

– (1935–1937), *La catégorie des cas. Étude de grammaire générale*. Acta Jutlandica 7:1 and 9:2, Aarhus, Universitetsforlaget.
– (1939) [1971], "Note sur les oppositions supprimables", in: Hjelmslev, Louis (1971), *Essais linguistiques*, Vol. I, Paris, Minuit, 90–96.
– (1943a) [1961], *Prolegomena to a theory of language* (second revised English edition), Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press. Translated from the Danish original by Francis Whitfield: *Omkring sprogteoriens grundlæggelse*, Copenhagen, Ejnar Munksgaard (1943).
– (1943b), "Langue et parole", *Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure*, 2, 29–44.
– (1959), "Pour une sémantique structurale", in: Hjelmslev, Louis, *Essais linguistiques*, Vol. I (*Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague* 12), København, Nordisk Sprog- og Kulturforlag, 96–112.
– (1963) [1970], *Language. An introduction*, Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press. Translated from the Danish original by Francis Whitfield: *Sproget. En introduction*, Copenhagen, Berlingske Leksikon Bibliotek (1963).

Hoffmann, Thomas & Trousdale, Graeme (2013), *The Oxford Handbook of Construction Grammar,* New York, Oxford University Press.

Höllein, Dagobert (2021), "Coseriu, significative semantics and a new system of semantic roles", in: Willems, Klaas & Munteanu, Cristinel (eds.), *Eugenio Coseriu: Past, Present and Future*, Berlin & New York, De Gruyter, 261–278.

Hymes, Dell & Fought, John (1981), *American structuralism*, The Hague & Paris, Mouton.

Itkonen, Esa (1978), *Grammatical theory and metascience: a critical investigation into methodological and philosophical foundations of autonomous linguistics*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins.
– (1983), *Causality in linguistic theory: a critical investigation into the philosophical and methodological foundations of non-autonomous linguistics,* London, Croom Helm.
– (1997), "The social ontology of meaning", *SKY 1997. Yearbook of the Linguistic Association of Finland*, 49–80.
– (2008), "Concerning the role of consciousness in linguistics", *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 15, 15–33.

Jackendoff, Ray (1990), *Semantic structures*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

Jäger, Ludwig (1976), "F. de Saussures historisch-hermeneutische Idee der Sprache", *Linguistik und Didaktik*, 27, 210–244.
– (1978), "F. de Saussures semiologische Begründung der Sprachtheorie", *Zeitschrift für Germanistische Linguistik*, 6, 18–30.
– (2003), "Wissenschaft der Sprache. Einleitender Kommentar zu den Notizen aus dem Gartenhaus", in: Jäger, Ludwig (ed.), *Ferdinand de Sau-*

ssure. Wissenschaft der Sprache. Neue Texte aus dem Nachlaß, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 11–55.

– (2010), *Ferdinand de Saussure. Zur Einführung*, Hamburg, Junius.

Jakobson, Roman (1931) [1962]. “Über die phonologischen Sprachbünde”, in: Jakobson, Roman (1962), *Selected writings*, Vol. 1: *Phonological studies*, The Hague & Paris, Mouton, 137–143.

– (1936) [1971], “Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasuslehre (Gesamtbedeutungen der russischen Kasus)”, in: Jakobson, Roman (1971), *Selected writings*, Vol. 2: *Word and language*, The Hague & Paris, Mouton, 23–71.

– (1939) [1971], “Signe zero”, in: Jakobson, Roman (1971), *Selected writings*, Vol. 2: *Word and language*, The Hague & Paris, Mouton, 211–219.

Jensen, Viggo Bank (2015), “Eli Fischer-Jørgensen, Eugenio Coseriu et Louis Hjelmslev: Quelques points d’une correspondence”, *Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure*, 68, 27–45.

Joseph, John E. (1995), “Trends in twentieth-century linguistics: an overview”, in: Koerner, E.F.K. & Asher, R.E. (eds.), *Concise history of the language sciences: from the Sumerians to the Cognitivists*, Oxford, Pergamon, 233–239.

– (2002), *From Whitney to Chomsky: essays in the history of American linguistics*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins.

– (2004), “The linguistic sign”, in: Sanders, Carol (ed.), *The Cambridge companion to Saussure*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 59–75.

– (2012), *Saussure*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Kabatek, Johannes (2000), “Einheitlichkeit der Bedeutung, Designat und Integrale Linguistik”, in: Staib, Bruno (ed.), *Linguistica romanica et indiana. Festschrift für Wolf Dietrich zum 60. Geburtstag*, Tübingen, Narr, 187–205.

– (2018), *Lingüística coseriana, lingüística histórica, tradiciones discursivas*. Edited by Cristina Bleorțu & David Paul Gerards, Madrid & Frankfurt am Main, Iberoamericana & Vervuert.

– (2020), “Linguistic norm in the linguistic theory of Eugenio Coseriu”, in: Lebsanft, Franz & Tacke, Felix (eds.), *Manual of standardization in the Romance languages*, Berlin & Boston, De Gruyter, 127–144.

– (2021), “Eugenio Coseriu on *immediacy*, *distance* and *discourse traditions*”, in: Willems, Klaas & Munteanu, Cristinel (eds.), *Eugenio Coseriu: Past, Present and Future*, Berlin & New York, De Gruyter, 227–244.

– (2022), *Eugenio Coseriu. Beyond structuralism*, Berlin & New York, De Gruyter.

Katz, Jerrold & Fodor, Jerry (1963), “The structure of a semantic theory”, *Language*, 39 (2), 170–210.

Katz, Jerrold, Fodor, Jerry & Postal, Paul (1964), *An integrated theory of linguistic descriptions*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

Kilarski, Marcin (2021), *A history of the study of the indigenous languages of North America*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins.

Kirsner, Robert (1979), *The problem of presentative sentences in Modern Dutch*, Amsterdam, North-Holland.

Kleiber, Georges (1990), *La sémantique du prototype. Catégories et sens lexical*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France.

Koch, Peter & Oesterreicher, Wulf (1985), "Sprache der Nähe – Sprache der Distanz. Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit im Spannungsfeld von Sprachtheorie und Sprachgeschichte", *Romanistisches Jahrbuch*, 36, 15–43.

– (2012), "Language of immediacy – language of distance: orality and literacy from the perspective of language theory and linguistic history", in: Lange, Claudia, Weber, Beatrix & Wolf, Göran (eds.), *Communicative spaces: variation, contact, change. Papers in honour of Ursula Schaefer*, Frankfurt am Main, Lang, 441–473.

Koerner, Konrad E.F. (1989), *Practicing linguistic historiography*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins.

Koerner, Konrad E.F. & Asher, Richard E. (eds., 1995), *Concise history of the language sciences: from the Sumerians to the Cognitivists*, Oxford, Pergamon.

Lambrecht, Knud (1987), "Sentence focus, information structure, and the thetic–categorical distinction", *Berkeley Linguistics Society*, 13, 366–382.

– (1994), *Information structure and sentence form*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

– (2000), "When subjects behave like objects", *Studies in Language*, 24, 611–682.

Langacker, Ronald (1987), *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*, Vol. 1: *Theoretical prerequisites*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.

– (1988a), "An overview of Cognitive Grammar", in: Rudzka-Ostyn, Brygida (ed.), *Topics in Cognitive Linguistics*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 3–48.

– (1988b), "A view of linguistic semantics", in: Rudzka-Ostyn, Brygida (ed.), *Topics in Cognitive Linguistics*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 49–90.

– (1999), "Assessing the cognitive linguistic enterprise", in: Janssen, Theo & Redeker, Gisela (eds.), *Cognitive Linguistics. Foundations, scope, and methodology*, Berlin & New York, Mouton de Gruyter, 13–59.

– (2007), "Cognitive Grammar", in: Geeraerts, Dirk & Cuyckens, Hubert (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, New York, Oxford University Press, 421–462.

Lazard, Gilbert (2006), *La quête des invariants interlangues: La linguistique est-elle une science?* Paris, Champion.

– (2012), "The case for pure linguistics", *Studies in Language*, 36 (2), 241–259.

Lehrer, Adrienne (1974), *Semantic fields and lexical structure*, Amsterdam, North-Holland.

Leino, Jaakko (2013), "Information structure", in: Hoffmann, Thomas & Trousdale, Graeme (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Construction Grammar*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 329–345.

Levinson, Stephen (2000), *Presumptive meanings. The theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

Linda, Markus (2001), *Elemente einer Semiologie des Hörens und Sprechens. Zum kommunikationstheoretischen Ansatz Ferdinand de Saussures*, Tübingen, Narr.

Lyons, John (1977), *Semantics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Martin, James (1992), *English text. System and structure*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins.

Matić, Dejan & Wedgwood, Daniel (2013), "The meanings of focus: the significance of an interpretation-based category in cross-linguistic analysis", *Journal of Linguistics*, 49, 127–163.

Newmeyer, Frederick (1998), *Language form and language function*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

– (2003), "Grammar is grammar and usage is usage", *Language*, 79 (4), 682–707.

– (2010), "On comparative concepts and descriptive categories: a reply to Haspelmath", *Language*, 86 (3), 688–695.

Oesterreicher, Wulf (2001), "Historizität – Sprachvariation, Sprachverschiedenheit, Sprachwandel", in: Haspelmath, Martin, König, Ekkehard, Oesterreicher, Wulf & Raible, Wolfgang (eds.), *Language typology and language universals/Sprachtypologie und sprachliche Universalien/La typologie des langues et les universaux linguistiques*, Vol. 2, Berlin & New York, De Gruyter, 1554–1595.

Perek, Florent (2015), *Argument structure in usage-based Construction Grammar*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins.

Piotrowski, David (1997), *Dynamiques et structures en langue*, Paris, Éditions du CNRS.

Pustejovsky, James (1995), *The Generative Lexicon*, Cambridge, MA & London, MIT Press.

RASMUSSEN, MICHAEL (ed., 1993), *Louis Hjelmslev et la sémiotique contemporaine*, Copenhagen, C.A. Reitzel.

RASTIER, FRANÇOIS (ed., 2016), *De l'essence double du langage et le renouveau du saussurisme*, Limoges, Éditions Lambert-Lucas.

REICHLING, ANTON (1935), *Het woord. Een studie omtrent de grondslag van taal en taalgebruik*, Nijmegen, J.J. Berkhout. (Second edition Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1967.)

SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE (1916/1922) [1975], *Cours de linguistique générale*. Publié par Charles Bally et Albert Sechehaye. Avec la collaboration de Albert Riedlinger. Edited by Tullio De Mauro, Paris, Payot.

– (1967–1968), *Cours de linguistique générale*. Édition critique par Rudolf Engler, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz.

– (2011), *Science du langage. De la double essence du langage*. Édition des *Écrits de linguistique générale* établie par René Amacker, Genève, Droz.

SCHLIEBEN-LANGE, BRIGITTE (1975), *Linguistische Pragmatik*, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer.

SCHMID, HANS-JÖRG (2016), "Why cognitive linguistic must embrace the pragmatic and social dimensions of language and how it could do so more seriously", *Cognitive Linguistics*, 27 (4), 543–557.

SILVERSTEIN, MICHAEL (1981), "Case marking and the nature of language", *Australian Journal of Linguistics*, 1 (2), 227–244.

SINHA, CHRIS (2002), "The cost of renovating the property: A reply to Marina Rakova", *Cognitive Linguistics*, 13 (3), 271–276.

SPERBER, DAN & WILSON, DEIRDRE (1986), *Relevance: communication and cognition*, Oxford, Blackwell & Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press (second edition, with postface, 1995).

STEHL, THOMAS & HASSLER, GERDA (eds., 2017), *Kompetenz – Funktion – Variation / Competencia – Función – Variación. Linguistica Coseriana V*, Frankfurt a.M., Peter Lang.

TAVERNIERS, MIRIAM (2011), "The syntax-semantics interface in systemic functional grammar: Halliday's interpretation of the Hjelmslevian model of stratification", *Journal of Pragmatics*, 43 (4), 1100–1126.

TAYLOR, JOHN (1999), "Cognitive semantics and structural semantics", in: Blank, Andreas & Koch, Peter (eds.), *Historical semantics and cognition*, Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter, 17–48.

– (2002), *Cognitive Grammar*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

– (2003), *Linguistic categorization* (third edition), Oxford, Oxford University Press.

– (2007), "Cognitive Linguistics and autonomous linguistics", in: Geeraerts, Dirk & Cuyckens, Hubert (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 566–588.

– (2012), *The mental corpus. How language is represented in the mind*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Teubert, Wolfgang (2016), Review of Patrick Hanks (2013), *Lexical Analysis: Norms and Exploitations*. *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics*, 21 (2), 272–283.

Thibault, Paul (1997), *Re-reading Saussure. The dynamics of signs in social life*, London & New York, Routledge.

Trabant, Jürgen (1986), *Apeliotes oder Der Sinn der Sprache: Wilhelm von Humboldts Sprach-Bild*, München, Fink.

Trubetzkoy, Nikolaj (1931), "Phonologie und Sprachgeographie", *Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague*, 4, 228–234.

– (1939) [1958], *Grundzüge der Phonologie*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Van De Walle, Jürgen (2009), *Method and form. An epistemological and historiographical analysis of Louis Hjelmslev's work*. PhD Ghent University.

Van De Walle, Jürgen, Willems Klaas & Willems Dominique (2006), "Structuralism", in: Östman, Jan-Ola & Verschueren, Jef (eds.), *Handbook of pragmatics*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 1–36.

Van der Gucht, Fieke, Willems, Klaas & De Cuypere, Ludovic (2007), "The iconicity of embodied meaning. Polysemy of spatial prepositions", *Language Sciences*, 29 (6), 733–754.

Vykypěl, Bohumil (2005), *Glossematikstudien: Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen zu Louis Hjelmslev Sprachtheorie*, Hamburg, Dr. Kovač.

Widoff, Andreas (2021), "System, norm and meaning", in: Willems, Klaas & Munteanu, Cristinel (eds.), *Eugenio Coseriu: Past, Present and Future*, Berlin & New York, De Gruyter, 245–260.

Wierzbicka, Anna (1972), *Semantic primitives*, Frankfurt, Athenäum.

– (1990), "'Prototypes save': On the uses and abuses of the notion of 'prototype' in linguistics and related fields", in: Tsohatzidis, Savas (ed.), *Meanings and prototypes: Studies in linguistic categorization*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 347–367.

– (1996), *Semantics. Primes and universals*, New York, Oxford University Press.

Willems, Klaas (1994), "Das Unbestimmtheitsprinzip und die Grundformen der Komposition", *Wirkendes Wort*, 44, 349–364.

– (2001), "Produktivität, syntaktische Struktur und Norm", *Zeitschrift für germanistische Linguistik*, 29, 143–166.

– (2011), "Meaning and interpretation: The semiotic similarities and differences between Cognitive Grammar and European structural linguistics", *Semiotica*, 185, 1–50.

– (2013), “The linguistic sign at the lexicon–syntax interface: assumptions and implications of the Generative Lexicon Theory”, *Semiotica*, 193, 233–287.

– (2016a), “A Comparison of the figure representing the ‘fait linguistique’ in the *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916) and its sources”, in: Gambarara, Daniele & Reboul, Fabienne (eds.), *Travaux des colloques Le cours de linguistique Générale, 1916–2016. L'émergence, le devenir*, Genève & Paris, Cercle Ferdinand de Saussure, 1–21.

– (2016b), “The universality of categories and meaning: A Coserian perspective”, *Acta Linguistica Hafniensia*, 48 (1), 110–133.

– (2019), “Eugenio Coserius Sprachzeichentheorie und der Prager Strukturalismus”, in: Hoskovec, Tomáš (ed.), *Expérience et avenir du structuralisme* (= *Travaux du Cercle linguistique de Prague. Nouvelle Série* 8), Kanina, OPS & Praha, PLK, 469–503.

– (2020), “Remarks on the ditransitive construction in German”, *Sprachwissenschaft*, 45 (2), 141–180.

Willems, Klaas & Willems, Dominique (2010), “Verbales Wortfeld, Norm und Polysemie”, *Zeitschrift fur romanische Philologie*, 126 (2), 237–274.

Willems, Klaas & Munteanu, Cristinel (eds., 2021), *Eugenio Coseriu. Past, present and future*, Berlin & Boston, De Gruyter.

Wüllner, Franz (1827), *Die Bedeutung der sprachlichen Casus und Modi. Ein Versuch*, Münster, Coppenrathsche Buch- und Kunsthandlung.

Wunderli, Peter (1981), “Saussure und die ‘signification’”, in: Geckeler, Horst, Schlieben-Lange, Brigitte, Trabant, Jürgen & Weydt, Harald (eds.), *Logos Semantikos. Studia linguistica in honorem Eugenio Coseriu 1921–1981*, Vol. 1: *Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie und der Sprachwissenschaft*, Berlin & New York: De Gruyter & Madrid, Gredos, 267–284.

Zinna, Alesssandro & Cigana, Lorenzo (eds., 2017), *Louis Hjelmslev (1899–1965). Le forme del linguaggio e del pensiero,* Toulouse, Éditions CAMS/O (http://mediation–semiotiques.com/archives/9812).

Zlatev, Jordan (2007), “Spatial semantics”, in: Geeraerts, Dirk & Cuyckens, Hubert (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 318–350.

– (2008), “The dependence of language on consciousness”, *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 15, 34–62.

Zwirner, Eberhard & Zwirner, Kurt (1936), *Grundfragen der Phonometrie*, Berlin, Metten.

Acknowledgments
We gratefully acknowledge the comments provided by two anonymous reviewers, which led to several improvements throughout the article. The usual disclaimer applies.

Authors: Klaas Willems, Professor of General Linguistics, Ghent University.
Thomas Belligh, Researcher at Ghent University, Department of Linguistics.
E-mails: Klaas.Willems@ugent.be / Thomas.belligh@ugent.be